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I. INTRODUCTION
High in the towers of academia, the lofty ideals of free speech are tossed 
around with a deceptive ease.  However, as legal minds grapple with heady 
legal doctrines, free speech has concrete consequences down at the foot 
of those towers. At this ivory base, the line between the university and
the community blurs.
January 2017.  The University of Washington and the Seattle Police 
Department sent 124 officers to quell violent demonstrations after a student 
group invited controversial speaker, and previous Breitbart News editor, Milo
674
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Yiannopoulos, to speak on campus.1  He spoke to the audience at the cost of
a shot-and-wounded protester and $75,000 in police overtime.2 
February 2017.  A mass of activists, self-identifying as antifascists and 
dressed in black, moved through Berkeley, California “with clubs and shields[,
lighting] fires, hurl[ing] Molotov cocktails, [and] smash[ing] windows” and
achieved their sole objective: to prevent Yiannopoulos from speaking at a 
University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) student organization’s
event.3  UC Berkeley cancelled the speech because of the violence and
corresponding public safety concerns.4 
UC Berkeley appeared on the verge of forsaking its own history as the 
cradle of modern free speech in 2017.5 In the 1960s, students promoting
 1. Daniel Gilbert, Milo Yiannopoulos at UW: A Speech, a Shooting and $75,000 
in Police Overtime, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 8:57 AM), http://www.seattletimes. 
com/seattle-news/crime/milo-yiannopoulos-at-uw-a-speech-a-shooting-and-75000-in-police-
overtime/.  Yiannopoulos became a pundit by discussing politics in an inflammatory style
on the Internet as a “clickbait provocateur” targeting the political left.  Dorian Lynskey,
The Rise and Fall of Milo Yiannopoulos–How a Shallow Actor Played the Bad Guy for
Money, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 1:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ 
feb/21/milo-yiannopoulos-rise-and-fall-shallow-actor-bad-guy-hate-speech [https://perma.cc/
URL6-RDTL].  A previous contributor to the Catholic Herald and the Daily Telegraph as
well as previous editor of conservative Breitbart News, Milo Yiannopoulos ventured into 
the speaking circuit to combat “political correctness” and is often accused of using “racially
charged language.”  Thomas Fuller & Christopher Mele, Berkeley Cancels Milo Yiannopoulos 
Speech, and Donald Trump Tweets Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/02/01/us/uc-berkeley-milo-yiannopoulos-protest.html.  He became well 
known during “Gamergate,” which sought to bring ethics to videogame journalism, while
still fomenting a hostile environment toward women. Lynskey, supra.  Propelled by viral 
videos, memes, and growth of the “alt-right,” he developed into a personality that championed
the alt-right into mainstream discourse. Id.  The Associated Press created guidelines for 
reporting on the alt-right and define it as “‘an offshoot of conservatism mixing racism, 
white nationalism and populism,’ or, more simply, ‘a white nationalist movement.’” John
Daniszewski, Writing About the ‘Alt-Right,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 28, 2016), https://blog. 
ap.org/behind-the-news/writing-about-the-alt-right [https://perma.cc/Y4TQ-S5PM]. 
2. Gilbert, supra note 1.
 3. Matt Saincome, Berkeley Riots: How Free Speech Debate Launched Violent 
Campus Showdown, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/ 
features/berkeley-riots-inside-the-campus-showdown-over-free-speech-w465151 [https:// 
perma.cc/BV5X-RFTM]; Julia Carrie Wong, UC Berkeley Cancels ‘Alt-Right’ Speaker
Milo Yiannopoulos as Thousands Protest, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2017, 6:56 AM), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/01/milo-yiannopoulos-uc-berkeley-event-cancelled
[https://perma.cc/G8LP-VEJH]. 
4. Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, Milo Yiannopoulos Event Canceled After Violence 
Erupts, BERKELEY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://news.berkeley.edu/2017/02/01/yiannopoulos- 
event-canceled/ [https://perma.cc/D49C-ZSYB].
5. See infra Section II.A.
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the Free Speech Movement sought to advocate political views on campus 
and spurred free speech initiatives across the United States.6  However, 
Milo Yiannopoulos’s speaking tour made clear that the problem of students
and nonstudents threatening or using violence to silence controversial
speakers is not unique to UC Berkeley.7  In the current wave of civil rights
and social justice debates, public universities face foreboding issues: what 
should a university and a city do when both nonstudent and student protesters 
repeatedly employ violence to bar a category of speakers, thus yielding de 
facto viewpoint discrimination despite viewpoint neutral university speaking 
policies?8  Further, what economic liability should a university and a city
shoulder in this situation? 
6. Regents of Univ. of Cal., Free Speech Movement Chronology, FREE SPEECH
MOVEMENT DIGITAL ARCHIVE (Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Free Speech Movement Chronology],
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/FSM/chron.html [https://perma.cc/56QX-AC48]; see also infra
Section II.A.
7. Similar acts of violence  have been used to shut down controversial speakers 
at the University of California, Davis (UC Davis); University of Washington; North
Dakota State University; Iowa State University; and Auburn University.  See Alex Connor, 
Milo Yiannopoulos Event at Iowa State Canceled, IOWA ST. DAILY (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/politics_and_administration/campus/article_7ec13
176-bb3d-11e6-97d3-ebc0806d061b.html [https://perma.cc/9FXN-7KW7]; Gilbert, supra
note 1; Matt Sepic, NDSU College Republicans Cancel Speech by Breitbart Writer Milo
Yiannopoulos, MPR NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/12/05/ 
ndsu-college-republicans-cancel-speech-by-milo-yiannopoulos [https://perma.cc/3C45-
W8TK]; Ben Poston & Shelby Grad, UC Protests Shut Down Milo Yiannopoulos Talk,
Sparking Free Speech Debate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017, 8:45 AM), http://www.latimes. 
com/local/lanow/la-me-milo-yiannopoulos-uc-davis-20170115-story.html [https://perma.cc/
CTC8-WLES].  However, this problem is not confined to public schools.  Travis M. Andrews,
Federal Judge Stops Auburn from Canceling White Nationalist Richard Spencer Speech. 
Protests and a Scuffle Greet Him, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/19/federal-judge-stops-auburn-from-canceling-white-
nationalists-speech-violence-erupts/?utm_term=.7945df579872 [https://perma.cc/LQV8-
6HBV].  Private schools have also faced violence in response to controversial speakers, 
such as at New York University, Middlebury College, and Claremont McKenna College. 
See Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebury-free-speech-violence/
518667/ [https://perma.cc/8S9R-TSF8]; Natasha Roy et al., Protests and Attacks Cut Gavin
McInnes’s Speech Short, WASH. SQUARE NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nyunews.com/ 
2017/02/02/2-2-news-gavin/ [https://perma.cc/YF4Q-HG5N]; Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., She 
Wanted to Criticize Black Lives Matter in a College Speech. A Protest Shut Her Down, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/
2017/04/10/she-wanted-to-criticize-black-lives-matter-in-a-college-speech-a-protest-shut- 
her-down/?utm_term=.ca04d5022011 [https://perma.cc/GY2K-TH2A].
8. This Comment addresses only public universities and colleges.  Under the “state 
action” doctrine, individual First Amendment rights are framed in relation to the government, 
not private individuals or private organizations.  See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 567 (1972). 
676
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Courts differentiate speech in schools from speech in other public
venues because the nature and purpose of the environment is different in
each.9  Moreover, courts treat speech in the university setting differently
than speech in K–12 education because of college students’ assumed level
of maturity and the fact that universities serve as forums for open dialogue.10 
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s establishment of unique free
speech doctrines for the school environment, university speech cannot be
as cleanly separated from the outside community’s speech.11  Especially 
on urban university campuses, speech does not stop at the perimeter of the
ivory tower; rather, speech flows between the campus and the community.12 
The dynamic between the university and the community ensures academia 
9.  The Supreme Court has observed: 
[S]tudents do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” . . . At the same time, we have held that “the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings,”. . . and that the rights of students “must be
‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,’ . . .” 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (first quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); then quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); and then quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)). 
10. See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015).  Courts are split on
the applicability of certain school free speech doctrines from K–12 to the university level. 
See id. at 863 n.9.  For example, when high school administrators censored articles in a 
high school sponsored newspaper, the Supreme Court held “[e]ducators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Although some circuits 
have found the Hazelwood standard applicable to universities, other circuits have declined
to adapt the standard to higher education. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863 n.9.
 11. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97. 
12. As seen in the university protests in early 2017, many of the violent protesters 
appear to have been nonstudents.  For example, The New York Times described the violent 
protesters at UC Berkeley as invading the university.  Fuller & Mele, supra note 1. At the 
University of Washington, the student organization inviting the speaker worried “that 
people who don’t attend the UW could come on campus and infiltrate peaceful protests 
with violent acts.”  Katherine Long, UW, WSU Brace for Speech by Milo Yiannopoulos, 
Breitbart Editor Banned from Twitter, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016, 6:20 PM), http:// 
www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/uw-wsu-brace-for-speech-by-breitbart-editor-
banned-from-twitter/.  “Ivory Tower” is a figure of speech that refers to academia or university.
Steven Shapin, The Ivory Tower: The History of a Figure of Speech and Its Cultural Uses, 
45 BJHS 1, 13–17 (2012). 
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does not become estranged from the communities that its research benefits.13 
However, this fluidity strains university resources in fostering and upholding 
free speech.14 
The stress reaches a breaking point when nonstudent speech and the
potential for community violence penetrate the university.15  In certain cases 
—like that of UC Berkeley—repeated protesting escalates into violence
and destruction of property, which causes campus police to shut down the 
speech.16  Universities may even cancel the speech in advance of the
speaker’s planned visit.17  Preemptive cancellation, and cancellation during 
the event, is known as a “heckler’s veto” and results when the government
silences a speaker because officials fear that the speaker will provoke 
a violent reaction from the audience.18  Despite university policies of
accepting diverse viewpoints, the repeated termination of unpopular speech 
yields de facto viewpoint discrimination through a heckler’s veto: silencing a
category of speakers where the specters of violence and property destruction
loom beyond the ivory tower’s walls. 
It appears the city and university owe controversial speakers some degree 
of a positive right to protect the speech.19  Given that there are limited  resources, 
13. See e.g., BIRGITTE ANDERSEN & FEDERICA ROSSI, THE FLOW OF KNOWLEDGE
FROM THE ACADEMIC RESEARCH BASE INTO THE ECONOMY: THE USE AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF FORMAL IPRS AND ‘SOFT IP’ IN UK UNIVERSITIES 4 (2010). 
14. See Gilbert, supra note 1.  Although not supported by constitutional mandates,
some scholars assert that the university can limit abusive speech to maintain the university’s 
educational purpose.  Robert C. Post, There is No 1st Amendment Right to Speak on a
College Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017, 11:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/
the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-protests 
[https://perma.cc/6X77-FBDA].
15. See supra note 12. 
16. See Saincome, supra note 3; Wong, supra note 3.
 17. See Susan Svrluga et al., Ann Coulter Speech at UC Berkeley Canceled, Again,
Amid Fears for Safety, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/26/ann-coulter-speech-canceled-at-uc-berkeley-amid-fears- 
for-safety/?utm_term=.509012784216 [https://perma.cc/357R-3Z5P].
18. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (citing HARRY KALVEN JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–60 (1965)); Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of
S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007); Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using 
First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions 
Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175, 180 (2016) (quoting Ronald B.
Standler, Heckler’s Veto, RBS2.com (Dec. 4, 1999), http://www.rbs2.com/heckler.htm 
[https://perma.cc/84ZN-JEL4]); see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 134 (1992); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985); Cheryl A. Leanza,
Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1305, 1308 (2007). 
19. See Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Leanza, supra note 18, at
1308, 1311.  Whereas negative rights, “require the government to refrain from certain
conduct, [positive rights] impose affirmative duties on the government to take actions or
expend resources to meet the needs of certain citizens.”  Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple 
678
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how far does this positive right extend?  How many resources should universities 
and their surrounding communities allocate to the protection of diverse 
and unpopular viewpoints? 
In confronting a heckler’s veto, public universities should afford speakers
the positive right to speak.  Given the importance of the free exchange of
ideas—especially at the home of modern free speech—the city and the 
university have an obligation to protect the speaker.  In employing their 
collective resources to protect speech, the city and university should create a
nuanced portfolio of high- and low-cost deterrents to defend the speaker
in both the short term and long term with the goal of reducing costs over 
time.
Part II of this Comment examines the historical context of speech at 
universities and discusses recent acts of violence directed at controversial
speakers on university campuses.  Part III argues that universities have 
not followed Supreme Court mandates in the face of a heckler’s veto.  The 
disjunction between university actions and court precedent mandates a 
consistent response: protecting speech—not rejecting speech.  Once past
this threshold issue, this Comment considers whether the Constitution 
affords a positive right to free speech, and if so, how much protection universities 
and their communities owe these controversial speakers.
Finally, Part IV examines possible solutions—both low and high resource 
intensive options—and ultimately concludes that public universities and 
the cities must adhere to First Amendment mandates in the face of violence. 
However, the cost imposed beyond what is reasonable for a university to 
bear for standard university-related security must be fully borne by the 
city to prevent chilled speech and to make the local city accountable
for curbing the violence. 
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Since the 1960s, students have used universities as forums to voice concerns.
However, unlike the Free Speech Movement and Campus Occupy protests,
students recently have launched protests against controversial speakers
instead of against the campus administration.  This pivot has forced public 
universities into an uneasy referee role—struggling to maintain peace while
upholding constitutional obligations.
Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 409, 410 (1990); see infra Section III.B.
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A. Historical Context: The 1960s Free Speech Movement, 2011 





With its epicenter at UC Berkeley in the 1960s, the Free Speech Movement 
bolstered the First Amendment’s commitment to free speech as students
worked to advance noncampus related “political and social action.”20 
Berkeley students’ off-campus demonstrations amidst the Civil Rights 
Movement worried university officials who believed that “on-campus political
advocacy was partially to blame” for the increased off-campus demonstrations.21 
When the 1964 fall semester began, the Dean of Students barred student 
organizations from tabling in the campus entrance and proclaimed “that 
collecting money or recruiting participants for off-campus political activity 
and taking positions on off-campus political issues [would] be prohibited.”22 
Soon thereafter, a collective of student organizations responded with the 
following two requests: 
1) Advocacy of any political viewpoint or action or to be able to distribute 
literature to that effect in the Bancroft-Telegraph area.
2) Permission to distribute literature from tables, from which they [could] attract, by
means of posters, interested people. They said they d[id] not want to force 
literature on pedestrians, but rather hand out literature to those who approach[ed]
them.23 
After the Dean prohibited students from advocating, recruiting, and soliciting 
funds for national political issues disconnected from the university, students 
from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress 
of Racial Equality set up tables in defiance of the new policy and were
subsequently suspended.24  In response to the university’s disciplinary action 
20. Free Speech Movement Chronology, supra note 6.  For a thorough chronological 
history of the Free Speech Movement integrated with primary sources created by UC 
Berkeley and its special collections library, see FSM Archives, Visual History: Free Speech 
Movement, 1964, FSM50, http://fsm.berkeley.edu/free-speech-movement-timeline/ [https://perma.
cc/4K8B-FPD8].
21.  FSM Archives, Gathering Place, supra note 20. 
22.  FSM Archives, Demands and Responses, supra note 20. 
23. Free Speech Movement Chronology, supra note 6 (emphasis added).  The 
Bancroft–Telegraph area refers to the area spanning from the strip of campus property that 
stretches from the intersection of Telegraph Avenue and Bancroft Way to Sather Gate.
24. Id.; FSM Archives, Students Suspended, supra note 20; Oakland Museum of
Cal., Unforgettable Change: 1960s: Free Speech Movement & The New American Left, 
PICTURE THIS, http://picturethis.museumca.org/timeline/unforgettable-change-1960s/free-
speech-movement/info [https://perma.cc/8TQZ-ZGBL].  In September 1964, University
President Clark Kerr took a hard stance against the protesters stating:
The University is an educational institution that has been given to the Regents 
as a trust to administer for educational reasons, and not to be used for direct 
political action. It wouldn’t be proper.  It is not right to use the University as a
680
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against those students, student protests began, and the Free Speech Movement
was born.25  The university changed its position over the course of the 1964 
fall semester in response to the movement.26  By the start of the 1965 spring 
semester, the new interim Chancellor performed an about-face and designated
Bancroft-Telegraph-Sproul plaza “as an open discussion area during certain 
hours of the day.”27 
Other universities soon followed UC Berkeley’s example and permitted 
greater student political activity on campus.28  After the protesters succeeded
in their crusade to bring noncampus political speech to campus forums,
student protesters used this foothold to debate and influence United States 
domestic and international policy.29 
basis from which people organize and undertake direct action in the surrounding
community. 
Free Speech Movement Chronology, supra note 6.  For a perspective from a contemporary
UC Berkley Chancellor on the actions of President Kerr and Chancellor Strong, see Nicholas
Dirks, Reflecting on the Legacy of the Free Speech Movement, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Oct.
10, 2014), http://www.dailycal.org/2014/10/10/reflecting-legacy-free-speech-movement/
[https://perma.cc/8LUS-L7EX] (“Neutrality could only be achieved through a reliance on
robust and free debate, not through the depoliticization of public spaces on campus.”). 
However, President Kerr’s position still holds traction among scholars such as Professor
Post, who argues the university can limit abusive speech to maintain the educational purpose of
the university.  Post, supra note 14. 
25. See FSM Archives, Demonstrators Gather in Sproul, supra note 20. 
26. See FSM Archives, The Beginning of Freedom, supra note 20. 
27. Id. Chancellor Meyerson’s 1965 policy reflects permissible “time, place, and 
manner” restrictions under current Supreme Court doctrine.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
28. See John Woodrow Cox, Berkeley Gave Birth to the Free Speech Movement in 
the 1960s. Now, Conservatives Are Demanding It Include Them, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/20/berkeley-gave-
birth-to-the-free-speech-movement-in-the-1960s-now-conservatives-are-demanding-it-
include-them/?utm_term=.39ea60ac86a2 [https://perma.cc/BZG9-5XJC]; FSM Archives, 
The Beginning of Freedom, supra note 20. 
29. See Robert Hurwitt, Free Speech Movement at UC Sparked Change Across U.S. 
Beyond, SFGATE (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Free-
Speech-Movement-at-UC-sparked-change-across-5769930.php#photo-6877255 [https:// 
perma.cc/6EBH-94N2?type=image].  As a result of the Free Speech Movement’s success,
both private and public universities followed the UC Berkeley protest model. See Cox, 
supra note 28. The Fall 1964 Free Speech Movement transitioned quickly into the Vietnam 
antiwar movement that spread through both cities and universities.  Hurwitt, supra. As a
long-term effect, it appears this movement precipitated a trend in increased student
engagement and involvement in universities. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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The same free speech issues in the 1960s reappeared during the Occupy 
Movement Protests in fall 2011 at UC Davis and UC Berkeley.30  Following 
the 2008 financial crisis, demonstrations spread throughout cities to protest 
financial inequality and the power of business interests in the government.31 
Many of these protests included encampments holding hundreds of people 
in addition to daily protesters.32  In 2011, the movement came to universities,
where students protested against university tuition increases and cuts to
public education in addition to the underlying grievances of the city-based
Occupy protests.33  At UC Berkeley, campus police and administrators sought
to uphold the campus “no-encampment policy.”34  When the protesters erected 
tents, campus police ordered them to remove the tents and disperse.35  After
the protesters refused, university police responded by removing the 
encampments with forty officers using batons and other types of physical 
force.36  At UC Davis, police officers used pepper spray on students, resulting 
in widespread public outrage.37 
As opposed to the Free Speech Movement and Occupy Protests, where 
protesters rallied against university policies and the administration, the 
recent protests are directed not against the university but against speakers
whom student organizations have invited to campus.38
 30. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR. & CHARLES F. ROBINSON, RESPONSE TO PROTESTS
ON UC CAMPUSES: A REPORT TO UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESIDENT MARK G. YUDOF
5 (2012), http://campusprotestreport.universityofcalifornia.edu/documents/protest-report-
091312.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA6W-BYAL].
31. JESSE CHOPER ET AL., COMM. OF U.C. BERKELEY POLICE REVIEW BD., REPORT 
ON NOVEMBER 9, 2011, at 12–13 (2012), http://www.berkeley.edu/news2/2012/06/PRB
Nov9report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LVN-XR7A].
32. Id.
 33. Id. at 1, 12; CRUZ REYNOSO ET AL., UC DAVIS NOVEMBER 18, 2011 “PEPPER
SPRAY INCIDENT” TASK FORCE REPORT 7 (2012).
34. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 13 (“Encampments or occupations of buildings 
are not allowed on our campus.  This means that members of our community are free to meet,
discuss, debate, and protest, but will not be allowed to set up tents or encampment structures.”
(quoting Chancellor Birgeneau)). 
35. Id. at 15–17. 
36. Id. at 18–23.  Past public relations nightmares could perhaps incentivize universities
to calculate such possible reoccurrences in addressing a controversial speaker.  Catherine
Rampell, The Newest Excuse for Shutting down Campus Speech: ‘Security,’ WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-newest-excuse- for-shutting-
down-campus-speech-security/2016/09/19/21f15762-7e9f-11e6-8d13-d7c704ef9fd9_story.html?
utm_term=.71805efc5a1d [https://perma.cc/BJJ4-DAPC].  To avert new public relations disasters, 
many schools appeal to “safety” as a shield against potential viral snafus and censorship
allegations.  Id.  As Rampell correctly identifies, the acquiescence to threats to public image or
violence “incentivizes more threats of violence.” Id.
 37. See REYNOSO ET AL., supra note 33, at 17. 
38. Compare EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 7–9 (discussing the 2011 Occupy
Protests over university policies), with Saincome, supra note 3 (discussing current protests 
over controversial speakers). 
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B. Current Context: Events, Players, and Conflict
In 2017, several student organizations invited speakers to their universities, 
but threatened protests and hostile acts prevented the speaker from speaking 
or forced the speaker to step down mid-speech.39  Universities did not shut
down the speech because of the speaker’s viewpoint; rather, they reportedly 
shut down the speech because of threatened or actual violence and corresponding 
public safety concerns.40 
In December 2016, a North Dakota State University student organization 
invited controversial “alt-right” speaker Milo Yiannopoulos to speak on
campus.41  However, the student organization cancelled Yiannopoulos’s
speaking engagement prior to his scheduled visit because of fear of violent 
protests.42  Also in December 2016, an Iowa State University unofficial 
student organization cancelled a planned Yiannopoulos speaking event 
after the university reportedly raised the security fees.43 
On January 9, 2017, UC Davis officials cancelled a speech by Yiannopoulos 
and former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli.44  Although campus police
 39. See supra note 7. 
40. See Connor, supra note 7; Svrluga et al., supra note 17; Wong, supra note 3.  The 
public safety concern centers on groups—many of whom are not affiliated with the university
—who come equipped and plan to use the campus as a “battleground.”  Svrluga et al., supra
note 17.  However, the public safety argument also raises the problem that safety may be 
used as a pretext for schools wishing to shield themselves from publicity of a violent 
protest. Rampell, supra note 36. 
41. Sepic, supra note 7. 
42. Id.  The university expressed concern that “destructive non-college students” 
would foment violence and did not want to jeopardize student safety. Paul Walsh, Breitbart 
Speaker’s Visit to NDSU Canceled, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2016, 8:53 PM), http://www.
startribune.com/breitbart-speaker-s-visit-to-ndsu-suddenly-canceled/404769426/ [https:// 
perma.cc/48TB-4B8N].  Although a student group is not a government agent and thus does
not trigger the state action doctrine, cancellations over feared violence is concerning.  See 
supra note 8.  This comment will give solutions based on transparent policies and expectations 
for student groups, protesters, and campus agents that will eliminate student groups’ fears
of violence. See infra Part IV. 
 43. Connor, supra note 7.  Although security fees are not the direct focus of this Comment, 
raising security fees appears to clash with a parallel First Amendment requirement. 
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (“Speech cannot be 
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might 
offend a hostile mob.”). 
44.  Poston & Grad, supra note 7.  Martin Shkreli was a hedge fund manager infamous
for raising prices for critical drugs.  Renae Merle, Martin Shkreli is Found Guilty of Three
of Eight Securities Fraud Charges, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/business/wp/2017/08/04/martin-shkreli-jury-enters-fifth-day-of-deliberations/?utm_
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denied there had been any acts of violence or destruction of property, the
sponsoring student organization cancelled the event after a few hundred
protesters blocked public access to the school building.45 
As mentioned above, a University of Washington student organization 
also invited Yiannopoulos to speak on campus on January 20, 2017.46 
Although the speech continued as planned, violent protests formed, and
one protester shot and wounded another.47  Moreover, both the university 
and Seattle police invested a staggering amount of resources to protect the 
speaker and uphold public safety: “[t]he officers put in almost 1,000 hours 
of overtime that day at a combined cost of more than $75,000, according 
to records and interviews. . . . rank[ing] among the UW Police Department’s 
most expensive events in recent years.”48 
Also mentioned above, UC Berkeley made headlines in February 2017.49 
Approximately 150 masked protesters succeeded in disrupting Milo
Yiannopoulos’s speech through violence and destruction of property.50 
After throwing a Molotov cocktail and breaking the venue’s window, the 
UC Police Department cancelled the speech and evacuated Yiannopoulos.51 
Berkeley experienced another incident when a student group invited
conservative commentator Ann Coulter to speak on campus in spring 2017.52 
In late March, the same campus organization invited Coulter to speak, but 
term=.fa75d5c33c7b [https://perma.cc/ZZR9-EBX8].  In August 2007, a jury found him guilty
of securities fraud. Id.
45. Poston & Grad, supra note 7. Although threatened violence may suggest a need
to silence the speaker, such a position does not comport with constitutional mandates and 
can be avoided by university and city policy changes that provide transparent expectations.
See infra Section III.A.3, Part IV. 
46. See Gilbert, supra note 1.
 47. Id.
 48. Id. The high security cost associated with protecting public safety and First 
Amendment protections raises the question, “[s]hould public institutions be spending
taxpayer money allocated for higher education on speakers who aren’t there for teaching 
and learning?”  Aaron Hanlon, What Stunts Like Milo Yiannopoulos’s ‘Free Speech Week’ 
Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/opinion/milo-
yiannopoulos-free-speech-week-berkeley.html.  Such a question is not unique to the University
of Washington. See id.; infra Section IV.E.  Although these security expenditures may
appear unnecessary, such determinations run counter to First Amendment obligations.  See
infra Section III.A.2. 
49. See supra Part I. 
50. Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, supra note 4; see also Fuller & Mele, supra note 1.
 51. Saincome, supra note 3; see also Fuller & Mele, supra note 1. 
52. Thomas Fuller, Berkeley Cancels Ann Coulter Speech Over Safety Fears, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/us/berkeley-ann-coulter-
speech-canceled.html.  Ann Coulter is a conservative pundit who comments on political
developments and who makes regular speaking appearances.  Emanuella Grinberg & Kyung 
Lah, Ann Coulter Isn’t Letting Berkeley off Easy for Messing with Her Speech, CNN (Apr.
21, 2017, 10:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/ann-coulter-uc-berkeley-speech- 
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/73MS-FV7D].
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in mid-April, the University cancelled the speech, citing safety concerns.53 
Shortly after the initial cancellation, the University revised its decision to 
allow the speech to take place upon finding a proper venue but rescheduled 
the speech for a time during the final exam study period.54  Ultimately,
Coulter cancelled her speech after losing the backing of the sponsoring
student organization.55 
UC Berkeley made headlines again in September 2017 when a student
organization invited conservative commentator Ben Shapiro to speak and 
then later partnered with Yiannopoulos to create a “Free Speech” week.56 
Shapiro succeeded in delivering his remarks with the aid of “unprecedented 
53. Tom Lochner, Right-Wing Star Ann Coulter to Speak at UC Berkeley, E. BAY 
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017, 2:05 PM), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/03/30/right-wing-star- 
ann-coulter-to-speak-at-uc-berkeley/; see also Fuller, supra note 52. 
 54. William Wan, Ann Coulter Rejects Berkeley’s New Invite; GOP Students Threaten
to Sue College, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/04/21/ann-coulter-rejects-berkeleys-new-invite-gop-students-threaten-to- 
sue-college/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.338f0c65459c [https://perma.cc/ZD8F-E7ET]. 
55. Jeremy W. Peters & Thomas Fuller, Ann Coulter Says She Will Pull Out of Speech 
at Berkeley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/ann-
coulter-berkeley-speech.html.  Although many instances involve the university cancelling
the speaker, this is an example where the sponsoring student organization cancelled the
event. See id. When the student organization pulls its support, there does not appear to 
be a First Amendment violation given there is no state action. See supra note 8. Given
the limited public forum status, the speaker’s invitation is contingent upon the student 
group. See infra Section III.A.1. Just as the student group can giveth a speaker the podium 
so too can it taketh the podium away.  However, students are responsible for following
university policies when inviting a speaker. See VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS,
U.C.-BERKELEY, MAJOR EVENTS HOSTED BY NON-DEPARTMENTAL USERS 3–8 (2018),
https://campuspol.berkeley.edu/policies/nondeptusers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FBW- M2DS];
see also  PRUDENCE CARTER & R. JAY WALLACE, REPORT OF THE CHANCELLOR’S 
COMMISSION ON FREE SPEECH 3, 15 (2018), https://chancellor.berkeley.edu/sites/default/ 
files/report_of_the_commission_on_free_speech.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2PZC-282B].  If a
speaker is barred based on a student group’s failure to follow such viewpoint neutral policy
requirements, the fault lies with the student organization—not the university. See id.
 56. Javier Panzar & Alene Tchekmedyian, 9 Arrested as Protesters Gather at UC 
Berkeley for Talk by Conservative Speaker Ben Shapiro, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017, 7:35
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-berkeley-protest-shapiro-20170914-
htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/XW5Z-SQGC]; Ashley Wong, Steve Bannon, Ann Coulter
Not Included in New List of Speakers for ‘Free Speech Week’ Released by UC Berkeley, 
DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/18/uc-berkeley-
releases-updated-list-speakers-free-speech-week/ [https://perma.cc/E4EV-T9Y6].  Ben
Shapiro is a “conservative thinker and entertainer” who has been labeled “the voice of the 
conservative millennial movement.”  Sabrina Tavernise, Ben Shapiro, a Provocative ‘Gladiator,’
Battles to Win Young Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/11/23/us/ben-shapiro-conservative.html?mtrref=www.google.com. 
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security measures.”57  These measures included employing concrete barriers
to enclose a half-mile-long perimeter around the venue, closing the event 
to ticket holders, and banning items that attendees could use as weapons.58 
The Berkeley City Council authorized officers to use pepper spray to enable 
crowd control, which partly reversed a pepper spray ban that had been in 
effect since 1997.59  In the end, the security measures cost the university 
$600,000.60  During the following Free Speech Week, the same student group 
and Yiannopoulos reportedly planned nine speaking events featuring
conservative speakers over the course of four days.61  In the days leading 
up to Free Speech Week, campus officials announced that only two speakers
confirmed their appearance with the university.62  However, the student
group cancelled at the last minute while the university “was in the process 
of allocating more than $1 million towards security for Free Speech Week.”63 
Despite the setback, Yiannopoulos sought to hold the event as an individual 
and berated the university for bullying conservative speakers into silence.64 
The hype surrounding Free Speech Week deflated into a twenty-minute 
appearance by Yiannopoulos, who addressed a crowd of fifty people while
blockades and checkpoints separated 150 protesters.65  The Chancellor 
labeled Free Speech Week “political theater . . . . designed to be a provocation 
to try [to get the university] to cancel the event and then to get the news 
story [the conservative speakers] wanted.”66 
57. Javier Panzar et al., Unprecedented Measures at Berkeley for Conservative 
Writer’s Speech, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ local/
lanow/la-me-berkeley-protests-far-right-shapiro-20170914-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/
54AY-D8FE].
58. Id.  This Comment addresses barricades and their effective use in deterring violence
from fomenting into a heckler’s veto. See infra Section IV.B.1.
59.  Panzar et al., supra note 57. 
60.  Panzar & Tchekmedyian, supra note 56. 
61. Wong, supra note 56.  The University also published a list of prohibited items 
for the demonstrations.  Chantelle Lee, UCPD Releases List of Banned Items for Potential 
Demonstrations in Response to Canceled ‘Free Speech Week,’ DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept.
23, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/23/ucpd-releases-list-banned-items-potential-
demonstrations-response-canceled-free-speech-week/ [https://perma.cc/7JLS-VYZG]. 
62. Wong, supra note 56. 
63. Harini Shyamsundar & Chantelle Lee, Berkeley Patriot Cancels ‘Free Speech




 65. Daily Californian News Staff, Milo Yiannopoulos Makes Brief Speech at UC
Berkeley as Hundreds Protest Outside Barriers, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/24/milo-yiannopoulos-speaks-uc-berkeley-hundreds-
protest-outside-barriers/ [https://perma.cc/S99E-5TV4]. 
66. Hannah Piette, ‘Free Speech Week’ at UC Berkeley was a ‘Political Theater,’ 
Carol Christ Tells ASUC Senate, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/ 
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In April 2017, Auburn University and its campus police attempted to
cancel a speech by white nationalist Richard Spencer “based on legitimate 
concerns and credible evidence that it [would] jeopardize the safety of 
students, faculty, staff and visitors.”67  However, a federal judge ruled against
Auburn and held that the university had to let Spencer speak because “there
was no evidence that Mr. Spencer advocate[d] violence [and that d]iscrimination
on the basis of message content cannot be tolerated under the First 
Amendment.’”68 
In assessing how universities have confronted controversial speakers
when faced with potentially violent protests, a question remains: what
should a university and city do, and what liability do they bear, when nonstudent 
and student protesters repeatedly employ violence to bar a consistent category 
of speakers—thus yielding de facto viewpoint discrimination despite neutral 
university speaking policies? 
III.  UNIVERSITIES MUST PROTECT CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKERS 

CONFRONTED BY HOSTILE PROTESTERS
 
Public universities are breaching their duty to protect controversial 
speech from a potentially violent crowd.  Universities should and must do
more to protect the value of uncomfortable speech.  The principles of free
speech not only “invite dispute” but also welcome speech that causes
unrest and anger so that individuals can vent their concerns in open, public
debate.69  Given the finite resources that universities have and their mission 
2017/10/05/chancellor-carol-christ-reflects-free-speech-week-asuc-senate-meeting/ [https://
perma.cc/3BUY-PNXQ].
67. Andrews, supra note 7. 
68. Stephanie Saul, Richard Spencer Speech at Auburn U. Greeted by Protests, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/us/judge-rules-auburn- 
must-allow-richard-spencer-to-speak.html?mcubz=3 (quoting Padgett v. Auburn Univ., 
No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74076, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2017)). 
Although groups with the good intention of denouncing hate speech may applaud when a 
university cancels a speaker, such applause is shortsighted; there are consequences, as seen 
in Auburn. See id. The consequences reflect constitutional mandates and can also have
financial ramifications.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech is Protected Free Speech, 
Even on College Campuses, VOX (Dec. 26, 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-
big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speech-first-amendment-protest [https://perma.
cc/T3CZ-H4PF].  A judicial remedy in response to such cancellation can include an injunction
allowing the speech, recovered attorney’s fees, monetary damages, and damage to the university’s
public image. Id.
69. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v.
City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949)).  As discussed in this Comment, the Constitution affords 
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to provide higher education, it is impracticable for universities to bear the 
total cost of protecting the speaker against violent protesters—especially 
in light of the fact that universities are not insulated from their surrounding
cities.70  Thus, the surrounding cities also have an obligation to shoulder
the cost of protecting the speaker and partner with universities both to
ensure public safety and to commit resources to protect speech.  First, 
universities have not followed Supreme Court mandates in the face of a
heckler’s veto.  Second, confronted with a heckler’s veto, speakers should have
a positive right to speak. 
A. University Inconsistency with Heckler’s Veto Case Law 
University responses to a potential heckler’s veto do not align with 
constitutional requirements.  Controversial speech is not unprotected speech 
even when it takes place on a public university campus.  As such, university 
responses should align with constitutional mandates to protect unsettling
speech—not reject the speech. 
1. Classifying the Venue at Issue 
A forum analysis illustrates the level of control a university maintains 
over its spaces, details the requirements for limiting access to the spaces,
and ultimately reveals that universities have breached their constitutional 
duty to prevent viewpoint discrimination effectuated through heckler’s 
vetoes.  The Supreme Court has delineated three categories that dictate how 
officials may regulate speech on government property: (1) public forum,
(2) limited public forum, and (3) nonpublic forum.71 
First, the most accessible is the public forum.72  Public forums include
traditionally open venues where people are the most free to assemble, such 
as streets and parks.73  Second, limited public forums are “state-created 
semi-public forums opened ‘for use by the public as a place for expressive
speakers—however controversial—a positive right to speak when confronted with hostility. 
See infra Section III.B.
 70. See Gilbert, supra note 1.
71. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740–41 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan notes an irony with the forum categories: “these public forum categories 
—originally conceived of as a way of preserving First Amendment rights . . . have been 
used in some of our recent decisions as a means of upholding restrictions on speech.” Id.
at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
72. Id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 
(1983).
73. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829– 
30 (1995); Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727; id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grace, 461 
U.S. at 177. 
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activity,’ such as university meeting facilities or school board meetings.”74 
As long as the public entity opens the limited public forum for the purposes 
established by the government, the forum is subject to the same requirements
as a public forum: “[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are
permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to 
effectuate a compelling state interest.”75  Third, nonpublic forums include
government property that is only open to the public for specialized uses— 
as opposed to being generally open to the public.76  Examples of nonpublic
forums include jails, military bases, and post offices.77  In nonpublic forums,
the state may control the property and place limits on its use as long as those
limits are viewpoint neutral.78 
The speaking venues at issue fit within the limited public forum category
because the spaces are “state-created semi-public forums [available] for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”79  In the context of a
limited forum, the university does not relinquish total oversight over the content
presented to the forum to “preserve[] the purposes of that limited forum”;
however, the university cannot discriminate against speech based on
viewpoint.80
 74. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n 
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
75. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981)). 
76. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727, 730; id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
77. See id. at 727; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 
385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). 
78. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730–32.  UC Berkeley’s policy for events hosted by
nonacademic departments—such as student organizations—emphasizes that the university 
will not look at viewpoint when examining applications to host events.  VICE CHANCELLOR
OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 1.  If a speaker is barred based on
a student group’s failure to follow such viewpoint neutral policy requirements, the fault
lies with the student organization—not the university.  The University of Washington takes a
similar stance. See Office of Special Programs, Safety and Security Protocols for Events, 
U.WASH. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://depts.washington.edu/sprogram/office-of-special- programs/ 
policies/safety-and-security-protocols-for-events/ [https://perma.cc/NBC7-TLEH].  However,
faculty and academic departments do not face such stringent restraints.  See Ani Vahradyan,
Renowned Lawyer Alan Dershowitz Confirmed to Speak at UC Berkeley Despite Setback with
Guest Speaker Policy, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/
10/02/renowned-pro-israel-lawyer-alan-dershowitz-invited-speak-uc-berkeley-law-school-dean/ 
[https://perma.cc/9UV6-YNAU].
79. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 740–41(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
80. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.  In Rosenberger, the court stated,
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For example, in City of Madison, Joint School District Number 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Court confronted open 
school board meetings.81  It held that a nonunion teacher could address the
school board because “permit[ting] one side of a debatable public question 
to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis 
of constitutional guarantees.”82  Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of the University of Virginia, when a Christian student newspaper asked 
the student activity fund to help cover publication costs and the fund then 
denied the application because of the paper’s religious content, the Court 
held that the university fund had engaged in viewpoint discrimination in 
light of the university’s prior funding of atheistic publications but not
religious ones.83 
During the controversies of 2017, student groups invited speakers to 
college and university meeting facilities.84  The types of facilities included 
student unions at Iowa State and UC Berkeley.85  Other alternative venues
included auditoriums and miscellaneous event spaces on campus that are
similar to the public school board meetings in City of Madison.86  On one
hand, these venues are not designed to be completely open to the public at all
times given that there are university policies governing the rental of 
campus space to visiting speakers and performances.87 On the other hand,
[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum
it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have
observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which
may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the
other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when
directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations. 
Id. at 829–30 (emphasis added). 
81. See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
429 U.S. 167, 169 (1976). 
82. Id. at 175–76. City of Madison’s holding bears weight at the current university
setting where conservative speakers who align with time, place, and manner restrictions are
heckled into silence whereas non-conservative speakers are not. See supra Section II.B.
 83. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822, 830, 835, 837. 
84. See supra Section II.B.  If the speakers were invited to speak at a private, off-
campus location, then any issue involving the school would be moot in light of the state 
action doctrine.  See supra note 8.
 85. See Connor, supra note 7; Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, supra note 4. 
86. See Saul, supra note 68; Deborah Strange, UF Denies White Nationalist Richard 
Spencer a Campus Platform, GAINESVILLE SUN (Aug. 16, 2017, 9:02 PM), http://www.
gainesville.com/news/20170816/uf-denies-white-nationalist-richard-spencer-campus-
platform [https://perma.cc/97DE-EFX8]; see also City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 174–76. 
87. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).  Rather than being open to
the public without regulation, universities have policies that regulate the time, place, and
manner for speakers and events not connected to or organized by individual academic 
departments. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, U.C. DAVIS, U.C. DAVIS POLICY AND
PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 400, § 1, at 2–5, https://ucdavispolicy.ellucid.com/documents/
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these venues are not areas open to the public for only specialized government
uses—such as jails, military bases, and post offices—because university
auditoriums and student unions are commonly used to host speakers from
across the intellectual and political spectrum.88 
The university meeting spaces at issue would likely be categorized as 
nonpublic forums when being used for class, considering that the public
university’s lecture hall is used for the specialized government purpose of 
giving registered students an education.89 Yet, in the current context, these 
student organized speaking events are not part of an academic department
lecture; rather, they are meeting spaces open to the public after the sponsoring 
student organization applies to rent the venue.90 
2. Universities Are Enabling De Facto Viewpoint Discrimination 
Through a Heckler’s Veto
The Supreme Court has stalwartly refused to permit a heckler’s veto.  A
heckler’s veto occurs when the government silences a speaker preemptively 
or mid-speech based upon an official’s fear that the speaker will upset the 
audience.91  Unless the speech falls within an unprotected category of 
speech or is barred by a forum analysis, an audience’s violent reaction 
view/37.  Such regulations for student groups and other groups involve applications, campus
security reports, and other requirements to book the venue. VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT 
AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 3–8. 
88. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966). The Supreme Court refers to and encourages 
universities’ role in public debate.  For example, Justice Kennedy warned that the “danger
[of] chilling of individual thought and expression. . . . is especially real in the University
setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment 
that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 
at 835. 
89. As in Kokinda, where solicitation on post office property was barred because it 
disrupted post office business, speakers can be barred from the daily class-used lecture hall
because of disturbance to the specialized government use of the hall to educate registered 
students. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732–33. 
90. See VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 
3–8. If an academic department or professor invited a speaker to present, then the forum
would be subject to the rules of a nonpublic forum. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727. 
91. Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007);
Johnson, supra note 18, at 180–81; see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985); Leanza, 
supra note 18, at 1308.  Regardless of whether the government silences the speaker before 
or during the speech, the critical inquiry is whether the government silences the speaker 
out of fear that the speaker will upset the audience. Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158.
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does not strip the speaker of First Amendment rights.92  Although judges 
and scholars have interpreted the Constitution as providing primarily
negative rights, the specter of a heckler’s veto is an area where the speaker 
should have a positive right to police protection in the face of a violent
audience.93  In Cox v. Louisiana, the Court held that a heckler’s actions
“necessitate[d] police protection” for the speaker.94  Thus, as one professor 
has argued, “[n]o matter how unpopular the speech, and regardless of
whether the hecklers are expressing the will of the majority, the value of 
that speech merits affirmative steps to protect it.”95 
Aside from the First Amendment’s general free speech protection, and 
the outer boundaries of those protections, a separate free speech doctrine
governs K–12 public schools in light of the school environment, the students’
maturity, and schools’ pedagogical goals.96  However, circuits are split 
over the applicability of certain K–12 school free speech doctrines at the 
university level.97  Despite the additional legal doctrines applicable to public
schools, the university-specific doctrines do not address heckler’s vetoes. 
Consequently, a traditional forum analysis better addresses how the university
and city should respond to a heckler’s veto.98 
92. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963); Bible Believers v.
Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 252 (6th Cir. 2015). 
93. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965).  But cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1417 (1986) (“[A]lthough the doctrine of
the heckler’s veto welcomes the strong arm of the law, it does so only on rare occasions, 
when violence is about to break out, and then only to divert the police action away from
the speaker and toward the mob.”). 
94. Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 
(1963)).
95. Johnson, supra note 18, at 187.  Johnson correctly identifies that controversial 
speech that stirs discomfort is entitled to state protection; however, he fails to address the
high costs associated with such protection.
96. See supra note 9. 
97. See supra note 10. 
98. As the courts have repeated, students do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, public schools do not need “to 
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’”  Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).  Despite the unique free speech doctrines applicable to
public schools, they were designed for the primary and secondary education environment— not
universities.  For example, the Hazelwood court held that schools could control “school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273.  The Supreme Court has not extended the ruling to 
universities and the circuit courts are split on the issue.  See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d
816, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007).  This Comment does not directly rely upon the school free 
speech doctrines.  First, the differing circuit opinions over the doctrine’s applicability to 
the university setting renders the binding force to this topic uncertain.  See id.  Second, the 
school speech doctrines center upon speakers’ impact on the closed forum classroom 
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Pushing against settled law on the impermissibility of heckler’s vetoes, 
universities are permitting heckler’s vetoes under the guise of protecting
public safety.  Some scholars suggest the state should step in to quell the 
crowd’s disorder at the cusp of violence breaking out.99  Of critical importance 
is that state action should address the crowd—not the speaker.100  Indeed, 
the Sixth Circuit mandates a more proactive approach, warning that states
should not “sit idly on the sidelines—watching as the crowd imposes,
through violence, a tyrannical majoritarian rule—only later to claim that
the speaker’s removal was necessary for his or her own protection.”101 
University of Washington and UC Berkeley presented two opposing 
methods in addressing controversial speakers in early 2017.  At the University
of Washington, Yiannopoulos came and completed his talk despite University
officers and ninety-five Seattle officers logging nearly one thousand hours 
environment—not outside speakers separate from the academic setting who have followed 
time, place, and manner restrictions.  See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Perry Educ. Ass’n
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).  Third, the forum analysis 
perspective better addresses the university setting in a way that encompasses the spirit of 
the Tinker–Fraser–Hazelwood line of decisions.  The nonpublic forum doctrine protects 
the classroom by restricting speech that is not used for the special government purposes. 
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727, 730 (1990); id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); supra Section III.A.1.  As previously explained, the recent protests at universities
fall under the limited public forum category, which is not a part of the university class 
setting; rather, the protests are part of extracurricular student groups distinct from the academic 
departmental setting. See supra Section III.A.1.  Thus, adapting the academic K-12 doctrines
to the university setting would not only be a leap that many courts have so far  been unwilling
to take, but also would stretch the doctrine beyond the classroom to the extracurricular
setting. See, e.g., Flint, 488 F.3d at 829 n.9.
 99. See Fiss, supra note 93. Fiss’s interpretation is consistent with that in Bible
Believers, where the court found that police must first make a sincere effort to protect the 
speaker confronted with a hostile crowd.  Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 
252–53 (6th Cir. 2015)
100. See supra note 93. 
101. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 253.  As J.D. Hsin takes a nuanced approach to the 
heckler’s veto: he details the problem as a “hostile takeover”—not necessarily a “hostile
audience” problem. J.D. Hsin, Defending the Public’s Forum: Theory and Doctrine in the
Problem of Provocative Speech, 96 HASTINGS L.J. 1099, 1124 (2018) (emphasis omitted). 
He sees government not aiding the hecklers in targeting the speaker; rather, he sees the 
government targeting the forum. Id.  In seeing the problem through a forum-focused lens, 
he argues the government has violated “its duty not to abet the standardization of 
expression in public forums.”  Id.  Through this lens, Hsin argues the state should focus 
its attention on “defending the forums.”  Id.  His argument provides a new conceptual
framework for assessing a heckler’s veto while still holding fast to the tenant that the
government has a duty to defend against viewpoint discrimination forced upon either a 
speaker or a forum by a mob. See id. 
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of work.102  Inversely, UC Berkeley responded to a Molotov cocktail and
property destruction with a “small and non-interventional” campus police
action and cancelled Yiannopoulos’ speech.103  Even when an unexpected
occurrence of violence may justify cancelling the speech to ensure public
safety, the First Amendment forbids employing public safety as a pretext
to silence controversial speech that may stir a crowd’s violent reaction.104 
The UC Berkeley Law Dean wrote, “[a] claim of a threat to public safety
never should be a pretext for silencing an unpopular speaker.  But there 
are times when protecting people requires preventing or ending speech.”105 
Universities have engaged in a pattern of cancelling speech in favor of a 
particular viewpoint because of potential violence and safety concerns from 
those who disagree with that viewpoint.106  Thus, in repeatedly ending the
speech under the guise of public safety, universities effectively uphold a 
de facto heckler’s veto that silences a viewpoint. 
3. Controversial Speech Is Not Unprotected Speech 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”107 
At a minimum, the amendment affords individuals freedom from federal 
and state governmental interference with their speech.108  Despite the First
Amendment’s sweeping language, the Supreme Court has established that 
not every utterance is protected.109  Such unprotected categories of speech
include incitement, “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
 102. Gilbert, supra note 1.
 103. Saincome, supra note 3.  UC Berkeley’s focus on safety and minimal police 
interference could be attributed to university officials’ fear of violence similar to the protests at
the University of Washington.  See Gilbert, supra note 1.
 104. See Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Be Done About Hate Speech?, BERKELEY
BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2017/08/18/what-can-be-done-about-
hate-speech/ [https://perma.cc/P5JD-4Y2R]. 
105. Id.  Although Dean Chemerinsky does not elaborate on what types of situations 
merit “preventing or ending the speech,” case law appears to set a high bar that requires
the state first make an earnest effort to protect the speaker. Id.; see Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 551–52 (1965); Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Bible Believers, 
805 F.3d at 250. 
106. See e.g., Svrluga et al., supra note 17; Wong, supra note 3.
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court incorporated 
the First Amendment freedom of speech into the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
108. See Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 410. 
109. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
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the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”110  The relevant categories of unprotected
speech relating to the conflicts on college campuses are incitement and
fighting words. 
Scholars disagree over how to address radical hate groups that promote 
hatred, discrimination, and false information.111  The school likely cannot 
cancel the speech under these circumstances unless the speaker (1) targets 
an individual in a direct and hostile manner that would incite an imminent 
reaction to the speech—fighting words—or (2) encourages the imminent use 
of violence or lawless action—incitement.112
 110. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (“It has been well observed that such utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”).  Since the 1940s, the court has carved out exceptions to
the First Amendment’s wide language. See id. Fighting words are those that “inflict 
injury” by their mere utterance and “tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id.
at 572 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (7th prtg. 
1941)).  Words inciting violence are not protected when the speaker seeks to and likely
will produce “imminent lawless action.”  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48
(1969). Public officials cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
their official conduct unless the official proves that the statement was made with “actual
malice.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).  Obscene material is 
not protected; however, statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully
limited according to three guidelines: (1) whether “‘the average person’ . . . would find 
that the work . . . appeals to the prurient interest,” (2) “whether the work depicts . . . sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” and (3) “whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”  Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 
(1972)). Nudity bans are upheld “when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home . . . 
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer . . . to avoid exposure.”  
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).  Child pornography is also 
not protected. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).  Finally, expressive conduct
is unprotected under the First Amendment when (1) the law is not directed at expression,
but incidentally burdens expression and (2) the government has a substantial justification
for the regulation that is not related to suppressing the message. United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
111. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 68 (arguing the university cannot bar unpopular 
speech or hate speech absent the speech falling into one of the categories of unprotected 
speech), with Post, supra note 14 (arguing that the university can limit abusive speech to
maintain the educational purpose of the university). 
112. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 524 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447–48 (1969); Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can
a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4–5 (2010). 
 695















    
 
   
 
    




    












a.  Fighting Words
Under the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire fighting words doctrine, the 
state may silence a speaker if the speaker’s words inflict injury by their 
mere utterance and tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.113  The
courts have limited the Chaplinsky fighting words unprotected speech
category over the last several decades.114  Instead of the category being 
triggered based on a particular word or series of words, courts require the 
speaker to address a definable audience “face to face and in a hostile 
manner” in relation to the specific context.115  In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
one of the first cases to undercut Chaplinsky’s holding, Cantwell denounced 
religious organizations “as instruments of Satan” on city streets.116  Cantwell’s
speech agitated the listeners, who threatened to attack Cantwell if he did 
not cease speaking.117  The Court upheld Cantwell’s speech because “a State
may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, 
under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”118 
Similarly, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, the Court overturned a 
speaker’s breach of the peace conviction when the crowd threw bottles 
and rocks at Terminiello after he denounced communists, Jewish people,
 113. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569, 574 (affirming Chaplinsky’s conviction when he
called a Marshall a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist”). In NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., the court succinctly described “fighting words” as words that “provoke 
immediate violence.”  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).  One of the rationales for allowing the government to silence 
fighting words is that such words “are no[t an] essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 
315 U.S. at 572 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 110, at 150). 
114. Calvert, supra note 112, at 2; see also Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 212 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“The unprotected category of speech called ‘fighting words’ is an extremely
narrow one.”).  Professor Calvert’s article examines the fighting words doctrine in the 
context of cyber-bullying.  Calvert, supra note 112, at 12.  Such an analysis proves useful when
examining whether a controversial speaker can be barred in advance of a speech if the speaker
targets students in advance.  A possible example could be if Yiannopoulos used his social 
media to directly attack a student—a variation on when he posted a screenshot from
a public Facebook post and Snapchat message.  See infra note 145. 
115. Lewis, 408 U.S. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at 
524.  Professor Calvert has found four elements that have limited fighting words: (1)
content of the speech, (2) target of the speech, (3) likelihood of reaction to the speech, and
(4) imminence of reaction to speech.  Calvert, supra note 112, at 4–5, 10 (“[E]xamin[ing] 
whether the fighting words doctrine . . . provides a mechanism for targeting and punishing 
the electronic speech of cyber bullies.”). The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he 
words are not inflammatory per se, without regard to the circumstances in which they were
uttered.”  Lamar v. Banks, 684 F.2d 714, 719 (11th Cir. 1982). 
116.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). 
117. Id. at 303. 
118. Id. at 308. 
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and African-Americans as dangers to the United States.119  The Court upheld 
such speech against government intervention unless the speech became a 
“clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”120 
The Court pivoted in Feiner v. New York, presenting an alternative view
—albeit one that the Court has avoided relying upon in recent decades.121 
In Feiner, a man jeered at government officials and organizations while 
encouraging black audience members to “fight for equal rights.”122  The police 
arrested Feiner after an onlooker told an officer that he would remove
Feiner if the police failed to do so.123  Ultimately, the court upheld Feiner’s
conviction for disorderly conduct because Feiner went beyond the expression 
of unpopular views; he incited the crowd to riot.124 
Over the years, the courts have narrowed Feiner’s reach.125  Two of the
narrowing cases intersected civil rights and free speech.  Edwards v. South
Carolina and Cox v. Louisiana involved black protesters advocating the 
end of segregation.126  In both cases, the police arrested the protesters after 
a crowd gathered and became restless.127 The Cox court relied on Edwards
and ruled that the peaceful protesters “were sufficiently opposed to the
views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate
police protection.”128  The Sixth Circuit recently interpreted the Civil Rights
cases as requiring police to address a restless crowd that the speaker offended 
rather than simply silencing a peaceful speaker.129
 119. See Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 15, 17–22 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
121. See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 245 (6th Cir. 2015); Leanza, 
supra note 18, at 1309. 
122.  Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951). 
123. Id. at 330 (Douglass, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 321 (majority opinion). 
125. See Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 245; Leanza, supra note 18, at 1309.  The particular 
justices sitting on the court could be a possible reason for the change from Terminiello to 
Feiner. Johnson, supra note 18, at 186.  Courts have seemingly shifted Feiner’s holding to the
doctrine of “incitement” rather than fighting words.  Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 245 (“The 
better view of Feiner is summed up, simply, by the following truism: when a speaker incites a
crowd to violence, his incitement does not receive constitutional protection.”).  Civil rights 
cases particularly narrowed Feiner. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 186. 
126. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229, 230 (1963). 
127. Cox, 379 U.S. at 538; Edwards, 372 U.S. at 233. 
128. Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (citing Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237). 
129. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 250. 
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Universities cannot rely upon the fighting words doctrine to preemptively
bar known controversial speakers.  As mentioned above, the courts have 
limited the fighting words doctrine to unessential utterances delivered in 
hostile, face-to-face context-specific interactions.130  In the present university 
context, the protests appear to be in line with the facts of Terminiello, Edwards, 
and Cox.131  As in Terminiello, where the crowd threw bottles and rocks
at the speaker, the crowd outside of the speaking venue at UC Berkeley
destroyed a police spotlight and smashed the student union’s windows.132 
Moreover, as in Edwards and Cox, the campus police silenced the speaker
in response to a restless crowd.133  Given the similarities between case 
precedent in the holdings of Terminiello, Edwards, and Cox and the current 
facts, the fighting words doctrine thus is plainly inapplicable. 
Students’ concerned that Yiannopoulos would target specific students’ 
immigration statuses, which would subject them to online harassment, does
not trigger the fighting words doctrine.134  Ahead of the event, UC Berkeley
 130. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra notes 119, 126–28 and accompanying text. 
132. See Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, supra note 4. Unlike other news articles and 
statements by the rejected speakers, the Public Affairs statement reflects the complexities of
protests on urban campuses. The article distinguishes “agitators . . . who came onto
campus” from students engaging in a “non-violent protest.” Id.  This specific language contrasts 
with those who conflate universities and their students with nonstudents from the community
who precipitate violence.  See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb.
2, 2017, 3:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827112633224544256?lang 
=en [https://perma.cc/G3DK-ZFQG] (“If U.C. Berkeley does not allow free speech and
practices violence on innocent people with a different point of view - NO FEDERAL FUNDS?”).
133. See Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, supra note 4; see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 554; Edwards, 
372 U.S. at 230. 
134. See Nanette Asimov, UC Warns Campus Group: Yiannopoulos Event Could 
Target Students, SFGATE (Feb. 1, 2017, 5:29 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/UC-
warns-campus-group-Yiannopoulos-event-could-10901517.php#photo-12269726 [https://
perma.cc/5XXM-CDS6?type=image].  The university’s letter to the hosting student group 
expressed concern that Yiannopoulos and “conservative think tank” David Horowitz Freedom
Center would employ past tactics of publicizing student information.  Id.  However, this
concern appears unfounded because it is unclear how Yiannopoulos would gain such private 
immigration information.  Further, the concern appears to have come from controversial 
liberal Drexel University professor George Ciccariello-Maher. See Maya Oppenheim, UC 
Berkeley Protests: Milo Yiannopoulos Planned to ‘Publicly Name Undocumented Students’ in
Cancelled Talk, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/world/americas/uc-berkely-protests-milo-yiannopoulos-publicly-name-undocumented- 
students-cancelled-talk-illegals-a7561321.html [https://perma.cc/AN5V-8DJK].  The source of
the concern, Professor Ciccariello-Maher, is significant because he recently resigned in 
response to the backlash from his own controversial tweets. See Marwa Eltagouri, Professor 
Who Tweeted, ‘All I Want for Christmas is White Genocide,’ Resigns after Year of Threats, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/ 
12/29/professor-who-tweeted-all-i-want-for-christmas-is-white-genocide-resigns-after-year-
of-threats/?utm_term=.abee04dfa69a.  Although the evidence regarding the possibility that 
Yiannopoulos would publicly reveal immigration statuses was lacking, Yiannopoulos previously
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warned the sponsoring student group that Yiannopoulos might reveal students’ 
personal information—thereby “putting students at risk” by possibly disclosing 
the identities of undocumented students on campus.135  Although this 
never occurred and regardless of the reprehensibility of such behavior that
would likely make the student a victim to prolonged online harassment, 
disclosing such information would not qualify as fighting words—even if 
the speech continued as planned and Yiannopoulos had revealed the 
undocumented students’ identities.  Although the disclosures might inflict 
injury by their mere utterance, the speech has two problems that remove
it from the fighting words category: (1) there is no face-to-face interaction
because the subject of the speech is not present, and (2) the words would
not tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace when compared to the 
hostile and face-to-face delivery of words such as “God damned racketeer” 
and “damned Fascist”—even when examined under the high-water mark
of Chaplinsky.136  Thus, the fighting words doctrine does not provide
universities the means to cancel speech when a crowd uses force to silence
a speaker it dislikes. 
b. Incitement 
Incitement finds its roots in the “clear and present danger” test, which 
holds that the state may bar speech in the face of violence or public harm.137 
Brandenburg v. Ohio modified this standard to permit the state to bar 
speech only where (1) “the speech explicitly or implicitly encourages violence”;
(2) “the speaker intends [the speech to] result in . . . violence” or unlawfulness;
and (3) the “imminent use of violence or lawless action is the likely result 
of [the] speech.”138 
publicly disparaged a transgender student’s identity at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Fuller & Mele, supra note 1.
 135. Asimov, supra note 134; see also Oppenheim, supra note 134. 
136.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 571–72 (1942). 
137. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and degree.”). 
138. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (recognizing the First Amendment rights 
of Ku Klux Klan members to advocate for white supremacy-based political reform)); see 
also Planned Parenthood/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 
1071 (9th Cir. 2001).
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The incitement doctrine likewise is inapplicable.  The protesters at UC
Berkeley did not merely encourage violence but also engaged in acts of 
violence and destruction of property.139  The speaker did not even have
the opportunity to speak.140 The inverse of inciting violence—where the
crowd instigates violence without the speaker encouraging the violence— 
does not trigger the government’s ability to silence the speaker under the 
incitement doctrine.141  Likewise, students’ concerns over the possibility of 
Yiannopoulos releasing students’ personal information does not open the 
door to triggering the incitement doctrine.142 
Although the university cancelled the speech before Yiannopoulos spoke, 
the university feared he would use the event to “target individuals, either 
in the audience or by using their personal information in a way that [would]
cause[] them to become human targets to serve a political agenda.”143  Such
public disclosure—if executed—would likely subject the individuals to 
severe online harassment and possibly deportation.  Indeed, before the failed 
Free Speech Week in September 2017, Yiannopoulos took a screenshot
of a transgender student and student body Senator’s public Facebook post 
that denounced hate directed at marginalized identities and posted it on
Instagram.144 Yiannopoulos also published on Instagram a screenshot of
a doctoral student who notified his students that he cancelled class because
 139. 
140. 





See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48. 
See Asimov, supra note 134. 
Id. 
144. Olivia Nouriani, UC Berkeley Students Harassed After Milo Yiannopoulos Publicly 
Identifies Them, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 21, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/ 
21/uc-berkeley-students-harassed-after-milo-yiannopoulos-publicly-identifies-them/ [https://
perma.cc/9A4G-78XT]; Milo Yiannopoulos (@milo.yiannopoulos), INSTAGRAM (Sept.
20, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BZR07_rg1To/?hl=en&taken-by=milo.yiannopoulos.
The student Senator’s public Facebook post denounced “violent chalking” that targeted
marginalized identities.  Yiannopoulos, supra.  Yiannopoulos captioned the screenshot on
Instagram “VIOLENT CHALKING I AM FUCKING DEAD.” Id.  Yiannopoulos appeared
to mock the student’s language of “violent chalking.” See id. “Chalking” refers to the use of 
chalk to write a message on pavement. See id. 
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of the feared danger during Free Speech Week.145  Yiannopoulos’ Instagram
posts inundated both students with online harassment and death threats.146 
Despite Yiannopoulos’s reprehensible actions, they do not fit within the
incitement doctrine.147 Ridicule does not rise to the violence required
under Brandenburg.148  Yiannopoulos’s social media postings did not
encourage any sort of violence that would result in imminent lawlessness.
In Brandenburg, as other Klan members held guns in the background, one 
Klan member in the film told the reporter that if the federal government 
continued to suppress white people “it’s possible that there might have to
be some revengeance [sic] taken”; he also added that black people should 
return to Africa and that Jewish people should return to Israel.149  In contrast 
to the veiled threats in Brandenburg, Yiannopoulos’s actions do not appear 
to trigger the incitement doctrine.  Yiannopoulos posted a screenshot of a 
public Facebook post and of a blurry Snapchat post.150  This simply does
not rise to the level of encouraging imminent lawlessness that the incitement
doctrine requires: there is no specific action and, importantly, no call to
violence; rather, Yiannopoulos essentially shared social media posts that 
the students publicly posted.151  Thus, in situations where the speaker merely 
re-conveys information from a third party who intentionally disclosed
 145. Nouriani, supra note 144; Milo Yiannopoulos (@milo.yiannopoulos), INSTAGRAM
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BZQ4GV9glH0/?hl=en&taken-by=milo. 
yiannopoulos. Like the student Senator’s public Facebook post, Yiannopoulos posted a 
screenshot of a Snapchat message to Instagram of a picture of the doctoral graduate student 
instructor that had the following accompanying text: “Today my Political Ecology teacher
didn’t even bother to lecture and spent the whole hour and a half dissing the administration
for allowing free speech week[.]  He wouldn’t even say free speech week[;] he called it Hate
and Harassment week[,] and he’s cancelling class.”  Yiannopoulos, supra. Yiannopoulos 
captioned screenshot on Instagram “haha thanks for sharing.” Id. 
146. Nouriani, supra note 144.
147. For a personal student reaction to this type of harassment, see Victoria Berdin, 
Students Must Resist, Hold Administration Accountable for ‘Free Speech Week,’ DAILY
CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/10/03/students-must-resist-
hold-administration-accountable-free-speech-week/ [https://perma.cc/8EER-XRSC].  Students
have a valid concern that their campus is being overrun by speakers who seek media attention 
at the expense of students who live and study on campus and who want to be free from the
waves of harassment and violence that accompany these controversial speakers.
148. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
149. Id. at 446–47 (emphasis added). 
150. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text. 
151. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48.  Even if Yiannopoulos’s actions fit within 
unlawful harassment, “[t]here is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s
free speech clause.”  Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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information on social media, the incitement doctrine does not provide the
means to cancel speech when the crowd uses force to silence a speaker it
dislikes. 
c. Controversial Speakers Do Not Warrant a New 
Unprotected Speech Category 
The alternative to the established categories of unprotected speech would 
be to create another category of unprotected speech applicable to public
universities and colleges that would allow them to bar a certain category 
of speaker.152  However, the courts are unlikely to allow this option.  Justice 
Kennedy has worried that the danger of “chilling . . . individual thought and
expression. . . . is especially real in the University setting, where the State
acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is 
at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”153  To allow 
colleges and universities to cancel the same controversial category of
speaker repeatedly would result in the impermissible “standardization of 
ideas” and viewpoint discrimination that the First Amendment is designed
to prevent.154 
152.  For a few of the recognized unprotected speech categories, see supra note 110. 
153. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995). 
Justice Kennedy’s concern echoes Chief Justice Warren’s concern in 1957: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident.  No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
that is played by those who guide and train our youth.  To impose any strait 
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.  Particularly is that true in the social
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot 
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding that a state Attorney
General’s questioning violated a professor’s “academic freedom and political expression” 
when he questioned the professor regarding his lectures and political party knowledge).  The
Ninth Circuit recently underscored the Supreme Court’s concern.  See Rodriguez, 605 F.3d 
at 708, 710 (holding that a professor’s racially inflammatory emails were “pure speech” and 
not unlawful harassment). 
154. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963) (quoting Terminiello
v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)).  The Ninth Circuit has stressed the importance of
discord over regulated speech, especially at universities:
Intellectual advancement has traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as
a diversity of views ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because 
they are popular.  Colleges and universities—sheltered from the currents of popular
opinion by tradition, geography, tenure and monetary endowments—have historically
fostered that exchange.  But that role in our society will not survive if certain 
points of view may be declared beyond the pale. 
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4. Harmonizing University Policy with Constitutional Mandates 
The risk of creating a new category of unprotected speech at universities 
to preemptively bar controversial speakers is too high.  The public universities’ 
position in society does not allow it.155  The potential for abuse warns
against it.156  The First Amendment’s protection against viewpoint discrimination 
shuns it.157  The only permissible action is for public universities and colleges
to allow divisive speakers and protect their right to speak when a crowd
uses force to silence them.  This solution protects the government from
the compromising position of differentiating between permissible and
impermissible speech.158  Harmonizing university policies with First 
Amendment policies barring a heckler’s veto requires government action
to quell a rambunctious crowd rather than the speaker.159 
Thus, universities should protect the controversial speech instead of silencing 
the speaker because controversial speech is not unprotected speech 
and controversial speech does not warrant a new category of unprotected
speech.
B. Controversial Speakers Have a Positive Right to State Protection 
Confronted with a heckler’s veto, speakers should have a positive right 
to speak. First, although written in terms of a negative right, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the First Amendment as providing a positive right 
to free speech.160  Second, the positive right yields a scarcity problem. 
Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 708. 
155. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. 
156. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975). 
157. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237–38. 
158. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
C. Vann Woodward et al., Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, 
YALE C. (Dec. 23, 1974), http://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/reports/report-committee- 
freedom-expression-yale [https://perma.cc/ZKD8-TNVS]. But see Jonathan Wallace & 
Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the Printing Press and Freedom 
of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 711, 718–19 (1997) (“Sunstein, contrary to the opinions of
First Amendment analysts supporting the marketplace of ideas metaphor, believes that government
should intervene in speech where necessary to promote democratic deliberation.”). 
159. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965). 
160. Although sometimes coined “the right to be heard,” Eve H. Lewin Wagner,
Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Conduct?, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 216 (1986), 
the concept can better be labeled as the right to speak uninterrupted. Even though the First
Amendment “invite[s] dispute” and welcomes speech that causes unrest and anger, there should
be a limit within limited public forums. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237 (quoting Terminiello v. City
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mited resources. 
reates a tension between upholding 
1. The First Amendment and Positive Rights 
Generally, scholars concede that the Constitution guarantees mostly negative
rights, “which require the government to refrain from certain conduct, as 
opposed to positive rights, which impose affirmative duties on the government 
to take actions or expend resources to meet the needs of certain citizens.”161 
Despite the negative rights interpretation, other scholars argue that the
Constitution also confers broader positive rights.162  Those opposing a positive
rights interpretation rely on the Supreme Court’s continued insistence on
distinguishing the two types of rights and limiting positive rights to where 
they are only blatantly clear, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.163 
These critics also highlight a key policy argument against positive rights: 
“[r]ights do not enforce themselves. . . . [r]ights enforcement requires
resources.”164  In addition to concerns that courts will overreach and legislatures
of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)).  As a limited public forum, the university can limit use of the
space through time, place, and manner restrictions.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)).  A failure to apply a limit would dissolve 
controversial events into shouting matches that would render the right to speech an empty
right where the loudest voice wins—not the strongest argument. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
UC Irvine’s Free Speech Debate, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/feb/18/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky18-2010feb18 [https://perma.cc/LUA5-2QYQ].  The 
heckler events during 2017 took place predominately outside the planned speaking venues. 
See supra Section II.B.  Although some protesters blocked doorways to the event, the hecklers
threatened or executed violence outside of the event forum. See supra Section II.B. In
such a scenario, the university should apply time, place, and manner restrictions to restrict
in-audience disturbances to ensure the invited speaker can communicate the speaker’s
message.  See Wagner, supra, at 237.  The event policy would simply bar audience members 
from shouting and disrupting the event.  Because the invited speaker—through the sponsoring 
student organization—followed the university’s time, place, and manner restrictions, the
heckler in the crowd should not be free to circumvent those same requirements.  As long
as the anti-heckler disruption policy is applied in all events, the policy would be applied in a
viewpoint neutral manner that would not offend the First Amendment.  See supra Section 
III.A.1.  This comment does not address the issue of whether nonviolent hecklers who merely
make loud noise within the auditorium to prevent the speaker from communicating a message
triggers a First Amendment violation.  For an example where nonviolent hecklers attempted to
silence the speaker within the venue, see Chemerinsky, supra. 
161. Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 410. 
162. See e.g., id.
 163. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 871 (2001).  Professor Cross argues that even if positive rights were 
recognized, the political-economic reality of implementing positive rights would make
positive rights ineffective. Id. at 862.  Cross appears to disapprove of a positive right to 
free speech.  See id. at 876.  However, such a position ignores the constitutional mandates 
in addressing a heckler’s veto.  See Cox, 379 U.S. at 551. 
164. Cross, supra note 163, at 880. 
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will be forced to increase taxes, scholars fear positive rights will not be 
enforced and merely relegated to law in name only.165 
Despite assertions that the Constitution is primarily a negative rights 
document, the Supreme Court has seemingly found positive rights in heckler’s 
veto cases. In Cantwell, the Court held: 
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the 
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears,
the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious. Equally obvious is it that
a state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under
the guise of conserving desirable conditions.166 
Later in Cox, the Court found that attacks against the protesters advocating 
racial integration “necessitate[d] police protection” for the speaker.167 One
author has argued, “[n]o matter how unpopular the speech, and regardless 
of whether the hecklers are expressing the will of the majority, the value 
of that speech merits affirmative steps to protect it.”168 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit has taken a more forceful approach in describing 
the state’s obligation: “Our point here is that before removing the speaker 
due to safety concerns, and thereby permanently cutting off his speech,
the police must first make bona fide efforts to protect the speaker from the 
crowd’s hostility by other, less restrictive means.”169  In providing this positive
right, the Sixth Circuit upheld the policy that, “[i]n fact, it is the minority
view, including expressive behavior that is deemed distasteful and highly 
offensive to the vast majority of people, that most often needs protection 
under the First Amendment.”170
 165. See e.g., id. at 887. 
166. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). Bible Believers echoes this 
forceful language. See infra note 169. 
167. Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 
(1963)).
168. Johnson, supra note 18, at 188. 
169. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 255 (6th Cir. 2015)  The use of 
the term “bona fide” suggests something stronger than mere lip service and seems to
go beyond a standard reasonable effort.  Id.  The State must take genuine action to protect
the speech.  This forcefulness parallels the language in Cantwell, where “the power of the 
State to prevent or punish [those who inflict riot, disorder, or interference] is obvious.” 
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.  Coupled together, both Cantwell and Bible Believers require
strong and effective government action in the face of a heckler’s veto. 
170. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d. at 243.  This sentiment follows the holding of Cohen, 
which held that a conviction of a man wearing a shirt that stated “Fuck the Draft” while in 
a courthouse where women and children were present was not supported by the fighting 
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2. 	Scarcity and Positive Rights: When the Limited Public Forum Strips 
the Central Nonpublic Forum of its Resources 
The realities of providing a university education conflict with First 
Amendment mandates against the heckler’s veto.  The standard forum analysis 
categorizes the student-organization-invited speaker as part of the limited 
public forum as opposed to the nonpublic forum of the class lecture hall.171 
Despite the different categories, they cannot be separated so cleanly.  At 
a university, the different forums often merge and intertwine. Although 
the lecture hall might be used for an academic class in one hour, it also might 
be used for a student organization meeting an hour later. Moreover, the 
university’s financial oversight of its property remains constant despite 
the forum reclassifications throughout the day.  At some point, the high cost
of retaining security to prevent an imminent heckler’s veto detracts from
the university’s central mission and focus: its nonpublic forum academic 
classes.172 
Universities might be tempted to silence the speaker under the guise of 
protecting the financial stability of the academic foundation of the university. 
However, such a view is shortsighted as it takes away from the current
multifaceted university education model.  Since the 1960s when students 
sought a voice in university affairs, students have continued to seek
opportunities to influence university policy, and universities increasingly
encourage students to take an active role in shaping their campus—from 
inclusion on faculty and administrative search committees to report writing 
research groups.173  Students’ ability to shape their educational development 
outside of the classroom is equally, if not more, important than their experience
inside the classroom.  Thus, universities should continue to defer to student 
words doctrine nor could the state make a simple display of an expletive a criminal offense. 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 20, 25–26 (1971). 
171. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–
30 (1995); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740–41 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
supra Section III.A.1. 
172. See Post, supra note 14 (“The entire purpose of a university is to educate and
to expand knowledge, and so everything a university does must be justified by reference 
to these twin purposes.  These objectives govern all university action, inside and outside 
the classroom; they are as applicable to nonprofessional speech as they are to student and 
faculty work.”). 
173. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 1; supra Section II.A.  Students at some colleges 
have protested class lectures themselves to change curricula and shape their classroom 
experience. See Chris Bodenner, The Surprising Revolt at the Most Liberal College in the 
Country, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/11/
the-surprising-revolt-at-reed/544682/ [https://perma.cc/SR9W-QY65].  In this case—if it 
were a public institution—silencing the protesters would be consistent with the First Amendment. 
As mentioned supra, the class itself is a nonpublic forum with the specialized government 
purpose of faculty educating students. See supra Section III.A.1.
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organizations and permit them the latitude to invite speakers whom they deem
to have educational value, just as universities defer to faculty members’
choice of guest lecturers or reading assignments. 
Universities may feel tempted to simply bar controversial speakers that 
administrators believe do not add any educational value to the campus.174 
Such a decision would rob students of the opportunity to seize control of 
their university education and to seek speakers whom they think would 
add something new and different to their university experience.  Barring
controversial speakers would also contribute to the homogenization of 
viewpoints on campuses.175  Moreover, under the forum analysis doctrine, 
once a university opens the door to allow student groups to invite speakers, 
the university cannot act as a gatekeeping filter that sits in judgment of 
which speakers pass educational muster.176  A university could create a
policy that makes the university a complete nonpublic forum—barring
student groups from inviting guest speakers onto university property.  The 
total nonpublic forum approach would remove the current university
conflicts with the First Amendment.177  However, as mentioned above, such
an extreme policy would run against the modern university emphasis on
holistic education both inside and outside the classroom and would diminish 
students’ ownership in shaping their education. 
3. The Dilemma: First Amendment Mandates and Scarcity 
Yet, a central problem remains: who—or what entity—bears the cost of 
protecting controversial speakers’ right to speak?  After all, as mentioned 
above, “[r]ights enforcement requires resources.”178  At first blush, universities 
and colleges seem to be the most appropriate entities to bear the cost of
protecting controversial speakers.  The incidents occur on campus.  The schools 
174. See Post, supra note 14.  However, preventing speakers that universities feel do
not add educational value runs counter to First Amendment case law that bars viewpoint 
discrimination in limited public forums.  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. 
175. The homogenization of viewpoints runs counter to “[t]he right to provoke, offend
and shock[, which] lies at the core of the First Amendment.”  Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty.
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010). 
176. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. 
177. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727, 730; id. at 740–41 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).
178. Cross, supra note 163, at 880.  Professor Cross identifies the economic implications 
of a positive right: at some point a positive right—or a collective of positive rights—
outstrips the government’s finite resources.  See id.
 707









   




     
  
 
   
    
  
       
   
 
    
   
    
     
   
   
   
    
    
  
       
     
     
   
 
     
are the ones most familiar with the venues, surrounding area, and student 
body, and the schools specifically train educators and administrators to work 
with students. Regardless, they should not bear the total cost.  During the
2017 incidents, the violent protesters included nonstudents from the 
surrounding cities.179  In many of these open campus environments, people
are free to roam between the campus and city—regardless of their status
as a student or nonstudent.180  A university alone is not equipped to handle
an influx of protesters from the community.181  Yet, as illustrated by the
protests in Charlottesville, Virginia, city police appear either ill equipped 
to manage violent protesters, or unwilling to do so, single handedly.182 
In summary, speech does not stop at the school’s perimeter; rather, the 
community and the university are part of the same intellectual ecosystem.
Thus, cities and open universities should collaborate in ending the violence
and paying the cost required to quell the violence—especially when the 
protests attract students and nonstudents alike.183
 179. See Fuller & Mele, supra note 1; see also Long, supra note 12. 
180. See infra Section IV.E. Examples of open campuses include Ann Arbor, Michigan; 
Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana; and the University of California campuses.  See 
infra Section IV.E.  Cities must share in the financial burden of the costs associated with
these incidents because of the fluidity between the campus and the university.
181. See Gilbert, supra note 1.
182. For a non-university incident where police did not appear to have enough 
resources or control to handle violence, see TREVOR GARMEY ET AL., HUNTON & WILLIAMS 
LLP, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE,
VIRGINIA 5–6 (2017), https://www.hunton.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34613/final-report-
ada-compliant-ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2NE-8YQF]; A.C. Thompson, Police Stood 
by as Mayhem Mounted in Charlottesville, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 12, 2017, 11:00 PM), https:// 
www.propublica.org/article/police-stood-by-as-mayhem-mounted-in-charlottesville [https:// 
perma.cc/4KAC-PPN5].  The August 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests involved white
supremacists who were part of the “Unite the Right Rally” and who violently confronted 
anti-racism counter-protesters.  Thompson, supra. The white supremacists “[came] prepared
for violence” with helmets, shields, and makeshift weapons. Id.  The protests escalated from
shoving to “wild melees” to pepper spray attacks. Id.  “The skirmishes culminated in . . .
domestic terrorism” when a white supremacist drove his car into a crowd—killing one and 
injuring nineteen. Id.; see also Robert Faturechi, Can Police Prevent the Next Charlottesville?, 
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/can-police-
prevent-the-next-charlottesville (outlining steps to avoid similar incidents).  An independent
report prepared by Hunton & Williams LLP revealed the police were not merely unprepared
but purposefully responded with passivity. See GARMEY ET AL., supra, at 6. The police
passivity in Charlottesville paralleled passivity of campus police at UC Berkeley in February
2017. See Saincome, supra note 3. 
183. For an example of a mutual aid policy between a county and university, see DENNIS 
L. BEENE & DACIA YOUNG, CAL. EMA, LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID PLAN 19 (Bruce 
Wilson ed., 2009), http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca/groups/police/documents/agenda/
oak032688.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC3Y-V9XY];CITY OF SHORELINE, INTERLOCAL COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID AND MOBILIZATION BETWEEN
THE CITIES OF KING COUNTY, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON POLICE, AND KING COUNTY 49, 
51, 53 (2003); and UNIV. OF CAL. POLICE, UNIVERSITYWIDE POLICE POLICIES AND
708
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IV. HOW MUCH PROTECTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONTROVERSIAL 
SPEECH—AND TO WHAT EXTENT? 
Revisiting the Washington–Berkeley dichotomy presented at the start 
of this Comment, universities and cities must foster an environment that 
encourages speech in the face of the high costs necessary to protect it.184 
Some scholars have suggested a long term intellectual approach “to 
foster the reasoned deliberation” to reinvigorate the “ideals of deliberative 
democracy” by encouraging respect between opposing sides.185  Although 
an educational and cooperative approach is vital to curbing hostile reactions
to speech, this approach loses sight of the integrated nature of the urban 
university and does not offer a solution when deliberative democracy
breaks down and the speech is still exposed to attack. Others suggest the 
university should pay the costs associated with high profile and controversial 
speakers.186  Yet, even though the university may appear to be the most
convenient entity to pay for the costs of expensive speech in addition to 
being the legally obligated entity to shoulder the cost instead of the speaker, 
the ties between student and nonstudent populations make it unreasonable 
for universities to bear the full cost of addressing potential reactions from 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES § 1308 (2011), https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4000382/Police 
ProceduresManual [https://perma.cc/J57X-4WLP].
184. Compare Fuller, supra note 52 (cancelling speech preemptively over fear of 
potential violence and safety concerns), and Pub. Affairs, U.C. Berkeley, supra note 4 (cancelling 
controversial speech because of protester’s violence and safety concerns), with Gilbert,
supra note 1 (continuing speech but having high police cost and a shot-and-wounded protester).
185. Nicholas A. Schroeder, comment, Avoiding Deliberation: Why the “Safe Space” 
Campus Cannot Comport with Deliberative Democracy, 2017 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 325, 358
(2017). There is a key problem with the “deliberative democracy” approach.  See id.  If
there were an effective enforcement mechanism, it would need to be applied in a viewpoint
neutral manner. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
830 (1995). Thus, universities would need to adopt rules for speakers invited by student 
organizations that would include an element of “foster[ing] deliberation” or a means to 
address a counter argument.  Schroeder, supra, at 357–58.  Although permissible if every
group needed to adopt similar elements for their speaker events, such a rule would rob the 
student organization of its ability to craft its preferred event and the speech it sought to 
present.
186. See Robert L. Waring, Talk is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at Public
Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 541, 543 (1995).  However, such a solution does
not consider that much of the costs are often in response to threats by nonstudents from 
the surrounding community. See supra note 40; infra Section IV.E.  Although UC Berkeley
usually spends $200,000 annually for protest security, the campus spent $1.5 million by
February 2017, spent an additional $600,000 for Ben Shapiro’s event, and was in the process 
of allocating $1 million for Free Speech Week. See infra Section IV.E.
 709




















   





    




   
    
 
the surrounding city.187  Universities and cities need to work together to 
develop an intersectional and multifaceted approach that recognizes the 
overlapping communities that come together to protest and counter-protest. 
Universities and cities should take several steps: (1) change university
student organization guest event policies to provide transparency and clear 
procedural expectations, (2) deploy hard power deterrent measures to eliminate 
violence from protests, (3) employ soft power deterrent initiatives to ensure 
protesters understand the line between protesting and violence, (4) view 
student organization event applications in a holistic context without making 
final determinations based on viewpoint, and (5) place the heightened security 
cost on the surrounding city.
A. University Policy Status and Changes
All universities and colleges detailed in this Comment have some type 
of free speech and expression policy, but the expansiveness of the different 
universities’ policies vary.188 
Despite investing tremendous resources in protecting Yiannopoulos’s 
speech, the University of Washington has a minimalist free speech policy.189 
It provides blanket language of valuing freedom of expression and “the 
right . . . to criticize and seek meaningful change.”190  Regardless of any 
viewpoint neutral internal processes the school may use to adhere to the 
viewpoint neutral requirements of a limited public forum when a speaker
is invited to campus, that internal process is not transparent and fails to 
define the policy’s scope or the factors taken into consideration when an
organization applies for event space to host a large event.191  Instead of campus
policy guidelines establishing security recommendations and detailing
how the non-departmental user application process functions, universities 
187. See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992). 
188. See supra Section II.B.
 189. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 478-124-020, 478-136-030 (2018). 
190. Id. at § 478-124-020(1).  After setting forth this general free speech policy, the 
Code prohibits the following conduct to effectuate the policy: obstructing access, “[p]hysical
abuse,” property damage, “[r]efusal to comply with” dispersal orders, possession of firearms 
and other dangerous items, “[p]ossession . . . of controlled substances,” and incitement of
any of the previously detailed conduct. Id. at 478-124-020(2); see also id. at § 478-136-
030.  Such restrictions pass constitutional muster because they do not apply to a speaker’s
content and apply to all people on campus.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
191. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–
30 (1995); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740–41 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Compare ADMIN. § 478-124-020 (containing a bare-bones statutory framework for addressing
campus facilities usage), with VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, 
supra note 55, at 3–8 (containing a detailed scope and list of procedures and factors for
addressing campus facilities usage). 
710
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force student organizations into an uncertain process that lacks standards 
they can address before a speaking event becomes out-of-control.192  Without 
clear guidelines, the university’s process of allowing student groups to invite 
guest speakers is a black box disconnected from any policy based on
permissible time, place, and manner restrictions.193  Although this vagueness 
and lack of transparency seem troublesome, it is the norm.194 
Iowa State University provides “Facilities and Grounds Use” rules that
embrace “public discourse and free speech” along with general time, place, 
and manner restrictions.195  The rules do not mention security assessments.196 
Without a clear policy for the role of campus police in creating an event 
security assessment to ensure event safety—and thus the methods considered
when making time, place, and manner restrictions—the students, community, 
and police cannot understand the role of police on campus.197  Establishing 
a clear set of policies for event coordination as well as the police’s role during
protests can help demonstrators understand the limit to protesting and give 
universities set procedures to implement time, place, and manner restrictions. 
Although not a clear set of policy procedures, North Dakota State University 
delineates the general role of the university, audience, and speaker.198  In
doing so, it upholds a commitment to viewpoint neutrality: a “courtesy of 
an uninterrupted presentation” afforded to the speaker, and the audience’s 
right to question and challenge the speaker.199  Similarly, Auburn University
upholds the importance of viewpoint neutrality but requires dissenters to
192. For an example of a university acting against this norm, see VICE CHANCELLOR
OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 3–8. 
193. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
194. See, e.g., ADMIN. § 478-124-020. The University of Washington developed a 
safety and security protocol in September 2017. See Office of Special Programs, supra
note 78.  Although the university expresses a commitment to viewpoint neutrality, it remains 
vague and unspecific. See id.  For example, the Protocol establishes that the “University will
perform an analysis of all event factors.”  Id.  The factors remain undefined and amorphous as
opposed to the clear procedures adopted by UC Berkeley in January 2018. See  VICE 
CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 3–8, 10–11. 
195. Facilities and Grounds Use, Activities, IOWA STATE UNIV. (Aug. 9, 2016), https://
www.policy.iastate.edu/policy/facilities/use#generalrules [https://perma.cc/Z5YT-KR7L]. 
196. See id.
 197. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46; EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 41–44. 
198. See N.D. STATE UNIV., POLICY MANUAL § 325 (2016), https://www.ndsu.edu/
fileadmin/policy/325.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z68V-BTKN].
199. Id.  Despite the lip service to upholding viewpoint neutrality, the university fails 
to address criteria for limiting time, place, and manner in accordance with the university’s
limited public forum.  See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
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comply with the university’s policies and procedures.200  Unlike the University 
of Washington, North Dakota State University and Auburn University do 
not connect their student conduct codes of prohibited conduct to their speech 
policies.201 
The University of California’s expansive policies exceed mere boilerplate
statements upholding viewpoint neutrality.202  In the wake of the Yiannopoulos
and Coulter speaking incidents, U.C. Berkeley created a policy for nonacademic
department entities that host events to raise awareness for existing policies 
and standardize them.203  The plan includes scope, general procedures, security 
procedures, cooperation with campus administration and security, and 
clear administrative roles for those involved in the event approval process.204 
The plan establishes clear expectations of how and why the university applies
its time, place, and manner restrictions.205  Although student organizations
may complain about the bureaucratic changes for campus event planning,
these changes provide more certainty in the event planning process and
thus give student groups a means to hold the university responsible when
it goes beyond the limited public forum’s time, place, and manner restrictions.
Most importantly, these changes allow student groups that invite controversial
speakers to defend the speech against a heckler’s veto through the security 
planning process that ensures clear expectations between event organizers
and campus police.206
 200. See DIV.OF STUDENTAFFAIRS,AUBURNUNIVERSITY EXPRESSION AND DEMONSTRATION
POLICY 1 (2018), https://sites.auburn.edu/admin/universitypolicies/Policies/ExpressionAnd 
DemonstrationPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WEQ-WNH6].
201. See WASH.ADMIN.CODE §§ 478-124-020 (2018).  Connecting a university’s student 
code of conduct, free speech policy, and guidelines for students to secure a guest speaker would
provide the greatest certainty to all parties as well as make the university publicly responsible
to its constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
202. See OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, U.C. DAVIS, supra note 87; VICE CHANCELLOR 
OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 3–8. 
203. See VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 
3–8. As opposed to the unspecific and vague “event factors” found in University of 
Washington’s Event Protocols, U.C. Berkeley created a comprehensive and clear set of procedures 
that yields the most transparency and reduces uncertainty. See Office of Special Programs,
supra note 78; VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, 
at 3–8. 
204. See VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 
3–8, 10–11. 
205. See id.; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
 206. See Revati Thatte, UC Berkeley Student Groups Face Revised Event Policy, 
DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/10/26/uc-berkeley-
student-groups-face-revised-event-policy/ [https://perma.cc/H94M-MYQA].
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B. Hard Power Deterrence
A hard power deterrent approach is the most expensive and controversial 
way to prevent violence from overpowering a speaker.207  However, it can 
be the most effective and immediate solution, given the police’s status as
first responders.208  Deterrence through proactive policing ensures the
protection of both free speech and public safety. The following are several
options available to universities and police forces that can be used individually 
or paired together. 
1. Precautions Before the Event 
University and city police forces can work together to help shape the
protest environment before it begins.  In planning for a protest, if officers 
fear potential clashes between protesting and counter protesting groups,
they can employ “strategically placed blockades that keep the two sides
separate,” as U.C. Berkeley successfully employed for Ben Shapiro’s event.209 
Although the separation may impact how the speech is executed, it would 
not discriminate against a specific viewpoint.  Physical division would be 
applied in a content neutral manner consistent with permissible time, place, 
and manner speech restrictions because such barriers are not contingent 
on what the speakers say but on the narrow government interest of ensuring
public safety.210 
Even if protesters argue that the barriers infringe upon their message in 
a public forum outside of the event venue, their argument will fail.  First, 
207. Many activists see police militarization as inflammatory and dangerous for
minority groups who have been historically and systematically targeted by police.  CARTER 
& WALLACE, supra note 55, at 9–10; see also Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: 
Why Police Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent 
Policing in Black Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 760–62 (2005); 
Adam Goldman, Trump Reverses Restrictions on Military Hardware for Police, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2gjItVt. Using a hard power deterrence approach gets close 
to—or even aligns with—this concern, given the high security measures taken to prevent 
a heckler’s veto. See Panzar et al., supra note 57. To best minimize police forces targeting 
certain groups while still deterring a heckler’s veto, universities must limit the use of force 
to when protesters act violently.  This result requires adherence to the nine recommendation
areas established in EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
208. See Sean Douglass, Note, From the Blue Lights of “Police” to the Red Lights 
of “First Responders”: The Changing Rhetoric of Law Enforcement in Michigan v. Bryant,
100 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1312 (2012). 
209. Faturechi, supra note 182; Panzar et al., supra note 57; supra Section II.B.
 210. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
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the barriers do not hinder their ability to denounce or support a speaker— 
only where they do so.  Second, even if the barriers were deemed part of the 
protesters’ message, such an argument would fail under Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, where the Court upheld a city noise ordinance requiring performers 
to use equipment provided by the city.211  The barriers do not silence the
protester’s message but instead aim to protect the speaker.  Further, similar 
to when the Court upheld a National Park regulation based on the interest
of protecting parkland that banned camping in specific parks for a homeless
awareness demonstration, the barriers here serve the narrow government
interest of promoting safety and speech by reducing the threat of a heckler’s
veto.212 Finally, because the barriers only extend the event venue’s perimeter, 
the protesters have multiple alternative areas outside the barriers to convey
their message.
Officials could also use preemptive monitoring and community engagement
tactics before and during the event.  To dissuade protesters from attending 
events when there is a potential for violence, city and university officials 
may employ social media to inform protesters about the speaker and the 
planned event.213  Social media engagement can give prospective protesters
and curious onlookers details that may dissuade them from adding more
unknown variables to an unmanageable crowd.  Although the speaker can 
claim such dissuasions hamper speech, the university does not lose the
ability to uphold its public safety role or to use its First Amendment right
to add its own opinion.214 
2. Precautions During the Event 
Police also can use drones to monitor large groups of protesters to identify
potential individuals who may intend to employ violence.215  In addressing 
police militarization concerns, police could employ special units “in distinctive 
211.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 803 (1989). 
212. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).  The 
time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the barriers are not too broad because they
surround a defined area deemed a safety concern in light of past protests and are not too
restrictive in a way that closes access to the entire university. Rather, the closures are 
confined to an area deemed a safety risk. See Emily DeRuy, Ben Shapiro at UC Berkeley:
What You Need to Know, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://www.mercurynews. 
com/2017/09/13/ben-shapiro-at-uc-berkeley-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/
7ZYU-VHPW].
213. This is a method that the City of Berkeley has used for city protests. Faturechi, supra
note 182. 
214. See Chemerinsky, supra note 104; infra note 218. A protester’s subjective claim of
chilled speech is not sufficient to bring a First Amendment claim.  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
13–14 (1972).
215. See Faturechi, supra note 182. 
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yellow vests, and without riot gear, so they can mix in with the demonstrators
less threateningly.”216  As with drones, specialized police within the crowd 
can spot problems before they escalate and can also serve to remind protesters
that there are legal consequences when they move beyond exercising their
First Amendment rights to taking violent action.217  Despite a potential chilling 
effect of adding police to crowds, officials only seek to chill unlawful crowd
behavior—not their speech.218  Further, police presence at large events and
protests is a typical and standard procedure inside and outside of college
campuses, regardless of the content or viewpoint of the speech.219  These 
specialized protest police units would ideally have ongoing “situation-oriented” 
training to build officers’ “perceptual skills, helping them develop the emotional 
intelligence to read members of crowds and make sound judgments about 
which situations are truly dangerous. . . . [to] achieve positive, nonfatal 
outcomes.”220 
When preemptive measures fail and violence threatens not only the speech 
but also public safety, officers need to act.  Police cannot stand by as the 
protesting audience harms peaceful protesters and destroys property.221  Nor
can police “silence the speaker as an expedient alternative to containing or
snuffing out the lawless behavior of the rioting individuals.”222  Such conduct 
216. Id.  German police forces utilize this methodology. Id.
 217. See id.
 218. See id.  A possible chilling effect does not render police presence a First Amendment
violation. As seen in Chaplinsky and Brandenburg, the State does not lose its ability to
enforce the law. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  In coupling First Amendment jurisprudence with
Article III Standing, the Supreme Court has asserted “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ 
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific 
future harm; ‘the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do 
not render advisory opinions.’”  Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14 (quoting United Pub. Workers 
of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)). 
219. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT
AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 2–3. 
220. Faturechi, supra note 182.  The specialized training would also equip police to 
address protesters seeking to provoke police. 
221. U.C. Berkeley’s response included minimal police response before police evacuated
the speaker and dispersed the crowd.  Saincome, supra note 3. However, this was likely
intentional in light of the 2011 Occupy Protests and the subsequent reforms at UC Davis 
and U.C. Berkeley.  See id.; EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 68.  The 2011 protests 
are distinguishable from the 2017 protests because the former focused on challenging 
university policies and the latter focused on challenging controversial speakers to campus.
See EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 68; Saincome, supra note 3.
222.  Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 252 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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would violate the speaker’s First Amendment rights.223  The role of police 
at a large event is not mere window dressing.224  Police have a substantive
duty to protect speech and promote public safety.  Police must ensure the 
state maintains a monopoly on the use of force.225 
3. Police Mutual Aid Policies 
Protecting campus speakers and ensuring public safety require “Mutual 
Aid Plan[s].”226 These plans “describe[] the standard procedures for acquiring 
aid and ensuring coordination between law enforcement agencies.”227 
Although universities are equipped to handle university students and their
events, officials’ ability to manage crowds and ensure safety is overextended 
when community members from outside the university join students
for campus events and protests.228  In these instances, the presence of 
community police would aid protesters in recognizing the intersectionality
with university events.  On the other hand, these mutual aid policies create
problems in training differences, information gaps, and command–control
shortfalls.229  The University of California created the Robinson–Edley Report,
an extensive action plan to address these problems after the 2011 campus Occupy
movement.230  Similar plans should be circulated to other universities and 
223. See id.
224. Officers have a substantive duty not to “sit idly on the sidelines—watching as 
the crowd imposes, through violence, a tyrannical majoritarian rule—only later to claim 
that the speaker’s removal was necessary for his or her own protection.”  Id. at 253. 
225. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at ix (1974). 
226. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 41–45. 
227. Id. at 41; BEENE & YOUNG, supra note 183, at 19, CITY OF SHORELINE, supra
note 183, at 49–57; UNIV. OF CAL. POLICE, supra note 183. 
228. See Saincome, supra note 3.  Despite claims that an enlarged police presence
might chill protester’s speech, such claims have no standing absent “specific present 
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972). 
229. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 41. 
230. Id. at 1.  University of California President, Mark Yudof, commissioned the Robinson–
Edley Report after the 2011 campus Occupy movement to detail recommendations for how 
the University of California should address protests and civil disobedience. Id. at 5–6. 
Although the Report reacted to 2011 campus Occupy protests over university policies and 
social inequality, President Yudof wanted the Report to address not just past protests but
also future protests and to avoid future use of force, which makes this report helpful in
addressing protests reacting to an invited speaker. Id. at 5.  The Report concludes with forty-
nine recommendations covering nine general areas: (1) civil disobedience challenges—
which “point[] out the need for the University to define and communicate more clearly the 
free speech rights and responsibilities of all members of the University community”; (2) 
relationship building—“to increase trust and understanding among campus stakeholders, 
by better utilizing existing communication channels and by building new ones”; (3) role definition
and coordination—to establish a “system for coordination between police and administrators,
with well-defined roles and a shared understanding that ultimate responsibility for the campus’s
response rests with the Chancellor”; (4) hiring and training—which involves “hiring police 
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cities to effectuate proper police response and coordination across police
forces to supplement barebones mutual aid plans.  Although some campus 
police have adopted a deescalation approach in response to the 2011 campus
Occupy movement, they cannot abdicate their roles of ensuring public safety 
and upholding the speech of controversial speakers.231  By establishing and 
implementing clear deterrence policies, universities can prevent protesters
from becoming an independent censorship police and put the monopoly
on force back in the government’s publicly accountable hands.232 
C. Soft Power Deterrence
In addition to funding campus police and training officers how to confront 
and engage with protesters, universities, colleges, and cities need policies
and initiatives to guide police approaches.  More importantly, universities 
should craft initiatives to steer students and nonstudents away from violent
demonstrations and toward open dialogue. 
University officials can impose campus regulations on the protesters
themselves.  One regulation could require a meeting before the potentially
violent demonstrations where officers and protest leaders meet to discuss
the protest.233 This approach falls in line with the “deliberative democracy”
approach to foster civility in disagreement.234  UC Berkeley’s amended policy 
requires a “security assessment meeting” between campus officials and the
officers and better training them about how to respond to civil disobedience”; (5) communications 
with protesters—to avoid civil disobedience “[w]ith strong communications between
demonstrators and the campus Administration”; (6) response during events—noting the “decisions 
made by administrators can directly affect whether the protest ends peacefully rather than 
with violence”; (7) documenting activity during demonstrations—recommending “several 
parallel methods for creating an accurate record of the actions of police and demonstrators 
during demonstrations”; (8) post-event review—recommending “the University adopt a
systemwide structure located outside of the police department and the campus Administration for
reviewing the response to civil disobedience”; and (9) implementation—to “suggest a 
process for implementing the recommendations in this Report.” Id. at 2–3. 
231. See Saincome, supra note 3.
 232. See NOZICK, supra note 225, at ix. 
233. Faturechi, supra note 182. 
234. Schroeder, supra note 185, at 355. This approach advocates providing each
viewpoint a designated area to give the same crowd the opportunity to assess the differing
viewpoints and allow the crowd to decide which arguments hold merit. Id. at 355–56.  This
approach meets “constitutional muster” because the university would be offering spaces 
for different viewpoints and not silencing one side of the speech.  Id. at 356 (citing United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
 717

























     









hosting organization for large events.235  A meet-and-confer meeting between 
protesters and the event organizers would comport with the requirements
of a limited public forum as long as it satisfies three requirements.236 
First, the university policy must be content neutral.237 The meet-and-
confer meeting would be content neutral as long as the meeting is standard
for every group and the viewpoints expressed in the meeting do not form
the basis for approving or denying a speaker.  Second, the meeting must
serve a “narrowly tailored” government interest.238  The narrow interest 
here is less certain.  If the university can prove such meetings deescalate 
potential violence and thus promote public safety, then perhaps this interest 
is sufficient.  Despite the weakness of this second element, the meeting
does not require the organizing group to make any alternatives to its event. 
Thus, as long as there is a sufficient alternative, or in this case no alternative
needed, the government can likely win with a weak interest.239  Third, the
restrictions must give the student organization alternative channels of expressing 
its message.240 Here, alternative channels are not needed because this
meeting does not restrict the speech of the actual event.  Despite the case
law and good intentions of this potential policy, this meeting would likely 
be ineffective in creating a dialogue with student and nonstudent protesters. 
The meet-and-confer meeting would be ineffective because nonstudent 
protesters often instigate the violence, nonstudents have no requirement to
meet with the administration, and the administration would need to somehow
predetermine and reach out to forecasted protest groups.  Thus, when a 
protest forms that does not go through the university’s policy steps, this 
type of security meeting fails to serve a preventative measure.
Another possible solution would be implementing “Anti-Mask Laws” 
to prevent protesters from covering their faces.241  Often, protesters implement 
a “black bloc” tactic in which “a group protests anonymously, faces 
concealed by T-shirts, bandannas or masks to avoid detection and protect 
235. VICE CHANCELLOR OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, U.C. BERKELEY, supra note 55, at 5. 
236. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983); supra Section III.A.1.
 237. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).  Further, the meeting’s substance or discussions cannot be used 
to approve or deny the speaker’s invitation status because doing so would make viewpoint 
a determination in approving a speaker.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
238. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
239. Michael Ramsey, Hugh & Hazel Darling Found. Professor, Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law, Constitutional Law I Class Lecture: Content-Neutral Restrictions of Speech
(Apr. 19, 2017).
240. Id. 
241. Faturechi, supra note 182. 
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from pepper spray.”242  However, there are First Amendment implications
to anti-mask laws—especially in California where the California Supreme 
Court held an anti-mask statute unconstitutional on the basis of free speech
for being overbroad and lacking a compelling state interest.243  On the  
other hand, anti-mask laws targeting criminal behavior would likely
pass constitutional muster and thus could be enforceable when protesters 
become violent.244 
A final controversial regulation involves barring protesters from carrying 
weapons on campus.245  In a clash with the Second Amendment, the Supreme
Court has found that the Second Amendment has exceptions, which include 
longstanding “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” such as “laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools.”246 
Many other universities share this view and already have policies on firearms 
and other weapons on campus.247 
In addressing students who partake in violence, universities can employ 
their student conduct process as an alternative to arrests if conditions and 
the offense warrant.248  Officers and administrators often confront the challenge
of distinguishing peaceful protesters and onlookers from the few protesters 
who wish to cause havoc and who merge with the mass of bodies.249  Thus,
campus police can only determine a student’s status after the police detain 
a protesting student.  Universities can attempt to dissuade students from
coming to potentially violent events and partaking in the violence by
announcing consequences for illegal behavior and by using the internal 
242. Andrew Beale & Sonner Kehrt, Behind Berkeley’s Semester of Hate, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2htYXdB. 
243. Ghafari v. Mun. Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 261 (1978) (holding that a broad 
anti-mask law was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds for being overbroad, 
vague, and unsupported by a compelling state interest when the protesting Iranian nationals
feared retaliation in Iran); see also Stephen J. Simoni, Note, “Who Goes There?”— 
Proposing a Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 245, 257 (1992); Matthew 
Haag, Is It Illegal to Wear Masks at a Protest? It Depends on the Place, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
26, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2pkUaNR. 
244. See Simoni, supra note 243, at 243 n.17. 
245. See Chemerinsky, supra note 104. 
246.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 627 n.26 (2008). 
247. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 478-124-020 (2018); Berkeley Campus Regulations 
Implementing University Policies, U.C. BERKELEY (Aug. 23, 2011), http://sa.berkeley. 
edu/uga/regs [https://perma.cc/Q3JV-RQ5N]; Facilities and Grounds Use, Activities, supra
note 195. 
248. See EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 66. 
249. See Beale & Kehrt, supra note 242. 
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student conduct process.250 UC Irvine has successfully used the student 
conduct alternative—despite being a cost and resource intensive option.251 
Student conduct uses an educational and self-awareness framework “designed 
to encourage students themselves to assume responsibility for their own 
behavior and discipline” rather than relying on the criminal justice system.252 
Although a useful tool for addressing certain student protesters, University of
California Police Chiefs expressed concern over enforcement inconsistency 
in referring students to the university conduct office while arresting nonstudents 
for the same type of civil disobedience.253  The Police Chiefs offered a
legislative suggestion to remedy the inconsistency: pass a law that allows police 
to have discretion in issuing civil disobedience citations as an alternative
to arrest.254 
As previously mentioned, universities and cities can dissuade community 
members from coming to violent protests through establishing transparent 
police protest policies.255  By understanding how an officer will respond in a
protest, demonstrators can self-monitor their actions with full knowledge 
of what behavior will trigger a police response.  With this transparency, campus 
police may be able to mitigate the number of bystanders and protesters who 
respond violently in the heat of the moment. 
Although universities cannot stop controversial speakers from coming
to campus because of the speakers’ views, universities can denounce speakers’
views. Allowing a speaker to come onto campus does not necessarily mean 
the university endorses that speaker’s views.256  Universities do not have
to sit in silence when confronted with hateful, discriminatory, or false speech. 
Rather, colleges and universities can, and should, use their own speech to
counter these messages in hope of using truth and reason to crowd-out hate
 250. See Howard Blume, Protesters Disrupt Talk by Pro-Police Author, Sparking 
Free-Speech Debate at Claremont McKenna College, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 10:20
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-macdonald-claremont-speech-disrupted- 
20170408-story.html [https://perma.cc/G6TY-2DZS]. 
251. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 67. 
252. Mahauganee D. Shaw, The Influence of Campus Protest on Student Conduct Policies:
The Case of Indiana University Bloomington, 2012 J. IND. U. STUDENT PERS. ASS’N 14, 
23, https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/jiuspa/article/view/1335/1953 [https://perma.
cc/TS2R-HZLC] (citation omitted). 
253. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 67 n.242. This concern surrounds civil 
disobedience and not necessarily destruction of property and other more serious offenses.
See id. at 67.  “Civil disobedience” rests on a spectrum somewhere between lawful compliance
with time, place, and manner restrictions and violent activity that threatens or “significantly
damages property.” Id. at 4. 
254. Id. at 80.
 255. Id. at 24. 
256. See N.D. STATE UNIV., supra note 198. 
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and falsities.257  Although the speaker may perceive a subjective chilling 
effect, such an action does not yield a First Amendment violation absent
a “specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”258 
Opposing student organizations can also work informally with the student 
groups inviting these speakers in the hopes of encouraging them to seek
speakers that do not rely on emotional appeals of hate. 
In the same vein of encouraging the university to speak out against hateful 
and false speech, universities and cities can forge educational initiatives 
that foster an understanding that uncensored controversial speech has value. 
Students and greater community members need to understand there is a 
line between protesting the speaker’s views and protesting violently with
the purpose of silencing a speaker. Protesting has limits; those limits need 
to be clear. 
D. Addressing the Context of the Speech 
When confronting an event with a high potential for violence, university 
and city officials need to look at the context of the speech to ensure violence
does not silence minority speech.  In preventing viewpoint discrimination, 
campus officials should not blindly examine each type of event in preparation
because each event requires a different level of response.  Rather, they need
to recognize the context of speech in the current socio-political climate,
which includes ascertaining who the speaker is, how other members from 
the speaker’s category have been confronted by protesters on other campuses, 
and how similar speakers have been confronted by protesters on their own
campus.  After the student organization follows the viewpoint neutral event
application process and the university approves the event, the most controversial
and well-known speakers will need greater protection.  Thus, campus officials 
need to look at the broad context of the proposed speaking engagement to 
257. See Carol Christ, Chancellor Christ: Free Speech Is Who We Are, BERKELEY 
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2017), http://news.berkeley.edu/2017/08/23/chancellor-christ-free-speech-is- 
who-we-are/. At first blush, it may seem the university is promoting a particular viewpoint
opposed to the invited speaker’s viewpoint.  However, the university is not silencing the 
speaker’s viewpoint; it is merely adding its own opinion and viewpoint—something encouraged
by the First Amendment. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–70 (2009); 
Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, 
the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 949 (2010);
Chemerinsky, supra note 104; supra note 218. 
258.  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972); supra note 218. 
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assess the degree of proportional police response necessary to protect
minority speakers’ rights intended by the First Amendment.259 
In assessing the context, campus officials need to differentiate between
protests against controversial speakers and protests against the university. 
For example, the University of California’s Robinson–Edley Report addresses 
campus protests challenging the university and its policies.260  The present 
protests do not target university policies alone; rather, they target the views 
of a speaker that a university group or student group has invited.261  In 
doing so, universities need to tailor police response to different settings.262 
E. Who Bears the Cost? 
In sum, universities and cities need to split the tab.  Public universities 
have an affirmative duty to prevent viewpoint discrimination.263  However,
they face a heavy financial weight that should give pause about whether 
financially burdened universities should spend their resources on extracurricular 
security costs at the expense of funding their academic objectives.264 
In the aftermath of the failed Free Speech Week, English Professor at 
Colby College Aaron Hanlon asked, “[s]hould public institutions be spending
taxpayer money allocated for higher education on speakers who aren’t 
there for teaching and learning?”265  UC Berkeley typically budgets $200,000 
259. See Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
836, 857–58 (1988). 
260. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 7–9. 
261. See supra Section II.A. 
262. The University and its police force should retain decision-making and oversight
roles.  As the Robinson–Edley Report notes, there are two potential problems when non-
university police engage protesters on campus: (1) the non-university officers are not accustomed 
to the campus population and its values and (2) the appearance of outside officers add to
campus tension. EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 43.  University of California policy
states that “[s]upervision of mutual aid personnel is the responsibility of the host campus.”
UNIV. OF CAL. POLICE, supra note 183. California’s Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan
establishes local supervisory authority. CAL. EMA, supra note 183, at 19 (“Unless otherwise
expressly provided, or later agreed upon, the responsible local law enforcement official of 
the jurisdiction requesting mutual aid shall remain in charge.”).  The University of Washington 
has a similar stance in giving command to the local agency. See CITY OF SHORELINE, supra
note 183, at add. A (“[T]he primarily responsible agency shall assume incident command . . . .”).
263. See supra Section III.B.
 264. See Hanlon, supra note 48. 
265. Id.  Recently, legal scholars such as Professor Schauer at the University of Virginia
School of Law have begun to ask questions on the cost associated with free speech and
controversial speakers. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE REVISITED 11– 
14 (2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Schauer_Hostile_Audience.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJE4-MZBW].  Professor Schauer places the resource dilemma in the 
context of the larger “problem of constitutionally mandated and potentially unpopular
allocation and reallocation of scarce resources.”  Id. at 14. However, Professor Schauer does 
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per year on security costs.266 By February 2017, the campus had spent $1.5
million for security.267  Hosting Ben Shapiro’s two-hour speech cost the
university $600,000.268  The university forecasted an additional $1 million 
for Free Speech Week.269 This cost is beyond what a university should
spend on security to uphold free speech.  Although campus officials stated
that the expenses did not cut into university funding, the money should 
have been spent on the university’s core functions.270 There is a point where
the security costs associated with the school’s First Amendment obligations 
strip the school of finances needed to fulfill its educational mission.271 
Although scholars have rightly expressed concern over the high cost, universities 
and cities need to work together to ensure that the cost is reduced while
preventing a heckler’s veto.272 
not suggest where to best place the cost nor does he note the dynamic nature of protests on
campuses that includes student and nonstudent protesters. 
266. Hanlon, supra note 48. 
267. Id. 
268.  Panzar & Tchekmedyian, supra note 56. 
269. Hanlon, supra note 48; see also Jocelyn Gecker, The Cost of Free Speech Isn’t
Cheap at UC Berkeley, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:22 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
politics/articles/2017-09-14/uc-berkeley-under-tight-security-for-conservative-speaker; 
CARTER & WALLACE, supra note 55, at 12–13.  The Commission was divided on the issue 
on how to confront a speaking event that carries a high cost for the university.  CARTER &
WALLACE, supra note 55, at 13. The Commission appears to adopt a standard of denying
speakers “if accommodating such challenges would impose costs above a generally applied
threshold.” Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).  After expressing uncertainty on where to place 
the cap, they confront the issue of scarce resources on one hand and legal obligations on
the other.  Id.  Instead of delving into this problem, the Commission punts the decision for
another day: “[t]he Commission suggests further exploration of this question.”  Id.
 270. See Gecker, supra note 269. 
271. See Post, supra note 14 (“It is a genuine challenge, therefore, how to analyze
student-invited speakers in terms of the goals of the university. . . . Unless they are wasting 
their resources on frolics and detours, they can support student-invited speakers only
because it serves university purposes to do so.  And these purposes must involve the purpose of
education.”). Moreover, the security presence concerns faculty and students who worry
their campus will become a militarized zone in an effort to protect controversial speakers. 
See Audrey McNamara & Harini Shyamsundar, UC Berkeley Faculty Members Call for 
Boycott of Classes During ‘Free Speech Week,’  DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 14, 2017), 
http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/13/uc-berkeley-faculty-members-call-boycott-classes-
free-speech-week/ [https://perma.cc/5M9X-XF5N].  At UC Berkeley, over one hundred faculty
members called for a class boycott to protest Free Speech Week, advocating that the university
should “cancel classes and tell students to stay home; close buildings and departments and 
allow staff to stay home, and not penalize students who are afraid of coming to campus.”
Id.
 272. See Chemerinsky, supra note 68; CARTER & WALLACE, supra note 55, at 12–13. 
 723





































        
      
 
 
At first blush, the cost may be best placed on the student organization. 
A student organization that knowingly invites a controversial speaker could
simply bear the financial burden of their guests.  Despite the simplicity of 
placing the cost on the student organization, such an allocation does not 
pass constitutional muster and fails to place the burden on the group or 
people causing the violence.273 Under Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 
the Court held an ordinance that allowed the government to adjust an assembly 
fee based on the “cost of maintaining public order” unconstitutional.274 
Invalidating the ordinance, the court asserted “[s]peech cannot be financially
burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it
might offend a hostile mob.”275  In addition to constitutional restraints on 
placing the cost on the student organizations, the allocation fails to put the 
cost on the people largely responsible for the violence—the nonstudents.276 
Thus, the student group should not bear the heightened security costs because
Forsyth does not permit it and such a solution fails to place the cost on the
people bringing violence. 
These protests largely consist of nonstudents from the surrounding cities.277 
University police exist to ensure student safety and address campus matters. 
Although university police can be trained to address these hecklers, they
should not be required to have this training to defend against an outside wave
of violent protesters.  University security costs should be allocated to their
designated purpose: addressing university and student security issues.  When
nonstudents enter the university and instigate violence, the university becomes
more than a forum for students, and the clean lines between the city and 
university blur: the university becomes engulfed by the city.278 Although 
campus police are better trained to address student safety and the campus
environment, the city should and must provide extra security and personnel
support.
A question remains: at what point is the university considered engulfed 
by the city, thus triggering city economic responsibility?  While the total 
cost of a protest can only be assessed after the public entities spend money
in preparation for the protest, the determination of who comprises a protest 
can be only determined during or after a protest.  However, in advance of 
a projected large-scale protest, university police may call for mutual aid
from city police but may not need the assistance on the day of the event if 
273. 
274. 
See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992). 
Id. at 124. 
275. Id. at 134–35. 
276. 
277. 
See Hanlon, supra note 48. 
See id. (“For the most part, both sides have little to do with college students who are,
by and large, angry to see their campus overrun by outsiders.”); see also Fuller & Mele, supra
note 1; Long, supra note 12; Saincome, supra note 3.
 278. See Hanlon, supra note 48; Long, supra note 12. 
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(a) the university overestimated the protest’s potential for violence or (b) 
university and city policy deterred a violent protest from forming.  In both 
scenarios—despite final costs being tallied after the protest—the money
will be spent in preparation for the protest in advance.  In the case of the former,
there should be a good faith reliance test.  If university police believed they
needed additional officers based on previous similar protests and information 
suggesting a large and potentially violent group of nonstudents, then the 
economic burden should fall with the city.  In the case of the latter, the
same result should apply.  If police believed they needed such preemptive 
deterrence procedures based on past similar protests and information on a 
violent nonstudent group and such deterrence succeeded, the city should 
carry the cost.  Thus, triggering city support requires a pre-protest good faith
determination that there will likely be a risk of violent protesters from the 
community. 
The cost shifting from the university to the city for these large protests
involving nonstudents accomplishes three goals: (1) it preserves the 
government’s duty to prevent viewpoint discrimination; (2) it places
accountability in the hands of the city, which is in the best position to address 
the violence; and (3) the accountability shift prevents a heckler’s veto.
First, the controversial speech is protected.  As mentioned above, public 
schools and public entities have a duty to refrain from infringing upon First 
Amendment rights—absent an unprotected speech exception.279  Shifting 
the financial burden to the city does not change this duty.  Rather, the shift
provides room for reducing both the ballooning security costs and the increased
violence associated with controversial speakers.
Second, shifting the cost to cities puts accountability in the hands of the 
entity that can best address both the high security costs and violence.  Protests
are an important part of civic engagement and thus have an economic and
social cost. Protests also have a limit: violence is unacceptable and places 
an unreasonable economic burden on universities.280  If the entire cost is
borne by public universities, then state taxpayers bear the cost.  The wide 
cost distribution diffuses the high bill to a wide tax base that can support the 
bill. Such a distribution encourages cities to ignore their citizens’ heckler’s
veto because the cost is borne by the entire state and not solely the city. 
The protest security cost is a small fraction of the state budget.  Thus, the 
unreasonable cost is distributed among state taxpayers with no close scrutiny, 
279. See supra Section III.B.
 280. See Hanlon, supra note 48. 
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as the cost is dwarfed within the size of the state budget, resulting in continued 
security costs as the violent heckler’s vetoes persist.
Shifting the cost to the cities surrounding the universities would force 
the same financial burden on a smaller tax base.  Under this high tax bill, 
cities would be forced to confront the violence to address the high financial
burden.281  Moreover, the cost should be absorbed by the people and areas
that incite the violence—not the millions of state taxpayers who are not in
the immediate area nor acted violently in an attempt to overthrow a 
controversial speaker.
Third, the security cost shift to localities would create a heavy financial 
burden that would force local entities to act to prevent a heckler’s veto.
The burden would force cities to address the violence by updating local 
ordinances, changing city policing strategies, and engaging with the local
citizenry in new ways to curb the violence.282  Once saddled with the specter 
of increased security costs, local taxpayers would be forced to hold one
another accountable and become active bystanders in their communities.283 
A problem with this system is if protestors abuse the cost shift to the 
city.  The financial shift to the city and the potential increased tax liability
on the citizens discourages abuses.  The greater the desire for protestors
to abuse and overwhelm the deterrent measures, the greater the ultimate 
cost lies with those protestors.  However, the disincentive is most ineffective
with student protestors.  Given students may be domiciled among their 
university campus, within the city around their university, or their hometown,
the financial cost would target nonstudent protestors disproportionately higher
than student protestors.  Nevertheless, financial pressure is not the only
disincentive for student protestors. Because the university has disciplinary 
oversight over its students, it may employ its student conduct system to create
further academic disincentives as an additional deterrent that would prevent 
student protestors from overpowering the financial burden shift.
281. Justice O’Connor’s federalism theory of accountability can be adapted to the 
present issue. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).  Although placing 
the cost on the universities would diminish local tax liability by spreading it across the state 
taxpayers, the small size of the financial burden in light of a much more expensive state 
budget does not cause state taxpayers to heavily scrutinize the violence in an attempt to
snuff it out. Shifting the cost to the local city government would empower local governments
to take responsibility and accountability for the violence.  See id. at 177. 
282. The city of Berkeley already attempted to meet constitutional mandates to prevent a 
heckler’s veto when it altered its pepper spray policy.  Panzar & Tchekmedyian, supra note 56. 
283. For a view of spreading liability among entities in the best position to carry the 
burden, see Justice Traynor’s tort products liability loss-spreading theory.  Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). “Active bystanders” 
are bystanders that intervene in harmful situations to reduce or eliminate threatened harm.
Sarah L. Swan, Bystander Interventions, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 975, 981–91 (2015). 
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Thus, to uphold universities’ duty to prevent viewpoint discrimination
coming from a violent nonstudent protest, the extra security costs should 
be borne by the surrounding cities.  The financial burden shift allows a 
university to conform with constitutional mandates, places financial
accountability on the population causing the violence, and uses economic
forces to reduce both net security costs and violence. 
V. CONCLUSION
Recent years were eventful in the history of campus protesting that differed 
markedly from the 1960s Free Speech Movement and 2011 Occupy protests.
As opposed to past protests, the current wave of protests is not responding
to university policies but rather to controversial speakers invited by student
organizations.284  In the past, university officials adopted a deescalation 
framework when confronting student protesters.285  Nevertheless, the current 
protests require a joint campus and city response to uphold speakers’ positive
rights and to confront the heckler’s veto.286 
Although campus officials cannot silence a speaker based on viewpoint, 
colleges and universities have engaged in de facto viewpoint discrimination
where protesters repeatedly resort to violence to bar a category of speakers. 
Campus security has been unable to quell the violent demonstrators: security
removed the speaker to preserve the speaker’s and the student’s safety rather
than targeting the hostile crowd. 
In addressing this problem, universities need to align their speaking policies 
with constitutional mandates.  Although positive rights are a controversial 
topic among constitutional scholars, the Supreme Court has seemingly afforded 
a positive right to speakers confronting a heckler’s veto.287  In the face of 
the high costs required to protect the speaker, the city and university have 
a joint duty to cover the cost together, given the integrated nature of student
and nonstudent protesters.  Cities and universities must collaborate to form 
joint proactive policies and procedures to address protests that border on 
heckler’s vetoes.  When confronted by a mass of violent protesters, the city 
284. Compare EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 7–9 (describing the 2011 Occupy
Protests over university policies), with Saincome, supra note 3 (describing current protests
over controversial speakers). 
285. See EDLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 30, at 61–65. 
286. See supra Section IV.E. 
287. See supra Section III.B.1. 
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